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ABSTRACT 
 
CHUANYIN XIE: How Do Ownership and Debt Affect R&D Investments in Privatized 
Firms? Evidence from the Emerging Economy of China  
(Under the direction of Hugh M. O’Neill) 
 
The effect of the privatization of publicly-traded firms (or leveraged buyouts) on 
innovation projects such as R&D has been the subject of much debate. On the one hand, 
private ownership is likely to motivate owner-managers to invest in R&D projects; on the 
other, a high level of debt financing would damage firms’ financial flexibility due to debt 
payments, thus reducing firms’ capability for R&D investments. Earlier studies demonstrated 
the negative relationship between buyouts and R&D investments, but recent research 
suggests buyouts may facilitate innovation such as R&D. This study attempts to untangle 
some controversies about R&D activities in privatized firms by extending the work on 
privatization of public firms in the West to formerly state-owned enterprises in China.  
 Specifically, I examine the effect of private ownership and firm debt on R&D 
investments in Chinese privatized firms. I argue that private ownership and firm debt may 
affect R&D investments both directly and indirectly. Private ownership could increase R&D 
investments because of its strong motivational effect and its link to effective governance 
structures for R&D activities. Debt would decrease R&D investments due to its financially 
constraining effect and its less likelihood as a financing tool for R&D investments. Given the 
risky nature of R&D investments, I also argue that private ownership and firm debt might 
affect R&D investments indirectly, mediated by risk perception. This indirect impact of 
iv
private ownership and firm debt would help resolve some conflicting arguments and 
evidence. 
 Data for testing hypotheses came from China and were obtained by survey. Two groups 
of industry were used: low and high R&D industries. The empirical results suggest that 
private ownership does not affect R&D investments directly or indirectly, but firm debt 
influences R&D investments both directly and indirectly. Risk perception was found to play 
an important role in managerial commitment to R&D projects in privatized firms.  The 
findings of this study provide implications for academics, practitioners and policy makers in 
the field of privatization, which is an important corporate restructuring tool and has been 
used widely by both developed and developing economies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Organizations can be grouped in three ownership classes: publicly-traded, state-owned, 
and privately-owned. The different ownership structures, according to Mascarenhas (1989), 
lead to differences in the interests and constraints of owners and managers, and in the 
conflicts between owners and managers. Ownership structure is important because it 
influences organizational behaviors (Perry & Rainey, 1988).  
 Among the three types of organization, publicly-traded firms (“public firms” for short) 
are more visible because they are required to disclose information on their activities. Partly 
for this reason, they have received much research attention (Mascarenhas, 1989). According 
to Pagano et al (1998), there are at least three advantages a public firm possesses: first, it can 
gain access to stock markets for funds. Second, owners of a public firm enjoy the benefits of 
share liquidity and portfolio diversification. Share trading on an organized exchange is cheap, 
and shareowners can diversify their investments easily. The third advantage lies in 
monitoring management behavior. The stock market can serve as “a managerial discipline 
device” by creating a market for corporate control. In addition, shareholders can design 
efficient compensation programs for their managers based on stock price information, or 
create incentive programs by offering them stock options. 
 Public firms cannot obtain these advantages without a cost. A frequently-cited and also 
much-studied issue in public firms is the agency problem – an organizing problem that arises 
2when cooperating parties have different goals and interests (Ross, 1973). Because of the 
separation of ownership and control, owners (principals) of public firms engage managers 
(agents) to perform some services on their behalf through delegating some decision-making 
authority to the managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This agency relationship causes 
agency problems because the interests of owners and managers may conflict and it is difficult 
or expensive for the owners to determine whether the managers have behaved properly 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Managers are likely to pursue their own interests at the expense of the 
owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and they may not have strong incentives to maximize the 
firm value.  
 To overcome or reduce the agency problem derived from the agency relationship, a 
variety of internal and external governance mechanisms have been developed, including 
boards of directors, ownership concentration, managerial stock ownership, stock options, the 
market for corporate control, and golden parachutes (Phan & Hill, 1995). These governance 
mechanisms are intended to achieve two goals: effective monitoring and the alignment of 
interests via incentives. Despite expectations, their role is limited due to three factors: 
information asymmetry, low levels of motivation to control on the part of the board of 
directors, and management entrenchment (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Unresolved agency 
problems often trigger firm privatization via leveraged buyouts (Fox & Marcus, 1992), which 
was a notable phenomenon in corporate America during the 1980s. 
1.1 Privatization of Publicly-Traded Firms 
 The privatization of public firms, or buyouts, is an often-used corporate restructuring 
method (Bruton et al, 2002). In buyout transactions, firms are taken private by converting 
public stock ownership to private ownership (Phan & Hill, 1995). Because buyouts are often 
3led by incumbent managers and financed by large debts, they are sometimes termed as 
management buyouts (MBOs) or leveraged buyouts (LBOs). It was reported that in a period 
from 1981 to 1989, more than 2540 publicly-traded firms went through a buyout, and the 
total buyout transactions involved a market value of over $297 billion and accounted for 17.0 
percent of all the corporate restructuring activities in terms of value (Mergerstat Review,
1989).  
 Though this buyout wave in the United States has long been past, as an accepted 
corporate restructuring practice (Bruton et al, 2002), it still keeps occurring. Recently, the 
buyout practice has shown a growing trend in other countries. For example, United Kingdom 
had seen an explosion of buyout activities in the 1990s, with the transaction value reaching 
£17 billion in 1999 from £3 billion in 1990 (Harris et al, 2005). In Japan, buyouts were not 
common in the early 1990s, but started to gain momentum in late 1990s and amounted to 116 
billion yen by value in 2001 (Wright & Kitamura, 2003).  
 A classical explanation of the widespread buyout practice is that buyouts can serve as 
an effective device to overcome the agency problem existing in the public-traded firms, 
which arises when ownership and control are separated (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1986). 
According to Jensen (1989), the agency problem is aggravated when the monitoring role of 
investors decreases, a common phenomenon in public firms with diluted ownership 
structures.  The decreased monitoring effort leads to increased managerial discretion to use 
resources for their own purposes such as engaging in unprofitable diversifications. Therefore, 
the privatization of public firms “was a correction for overexpansion and overdiversification” 
which were at the expense of firm value (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993). 
4After buyouts, the privatized firms enjoy two advantages: managerial motivation and 
discipline (Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Magowan (1989) argued that managers 
are now transformed into owners – owners’ money is also the managers’ money, so they 
have incentives to improve operational efficiency so as to create more value for their own 
assets. Managerial discipline is associated with high-levels of debt most buyout firms have 
involved. Jensen (1986) reasoned that the need to repay debt in buyout firms could discipline 
management behavior by forcing them to use cash more efficiently. The debt burden 
encourages managers to further improve efficiency through removing unprofitable 
investment projects, disposing of excessive resources or assets, and increasing accountability.  
 Given the twin spurs of managerial motivation and debt-based discipline, it is expected 
that privatized firms could not only improve their short-term profitability, but also likely their 
long-term growth. On the one hand, private ownership is likely to motivate owner-managers 
to invest in longer-term R&D projects; on the other, debt discipline would facilitate firms’ 
more productive behavior such as restricting unproductive R&D projects (Long & 
Ravenscraft, 1993) and focusing on core competencies (Wiersema & Liebeskind, 1995).  
 Despite the theories in favor of privatization, scholars debate the positive effect of 
buyouts (Fox & Marcus, 1992). Centering on the debate is the financing method of buyouts – 
a mountain of debt. According to Seth and Easterwood (1993), heavy debt loads may cause 
two unfavorable results: first, managers may raise cash for debt service by selling valuable 
assets at prices less than their value, which reduces competitive advantages; second, heavy 
debt burden limits firm flexibility and responsiveness to competitive environments due to 
debt payments. Therefore, buyout firms are likely to focus on short-term performance at the 
expense of long-term investments like R&D projects (Hill et al, 1988; Reich, 1989). Because 
5of the negative consequences of high levels of debt financing, the effect of buyouts on 
managerial commitment to innovation has become a controversial issue (Zahra, 1995).  
 In response to the opposing views on privatization from both advocates and critics, a 
number of empirical studies have been conducted. Generally, the empirical evidence has 
supported the view of efficiency improvement (e.g., Bruton et al, 2002; Kaplan, 1988; Phan 
& Hill, 1995; Singh, 1990), but generated less encouraging prospects for innovation in post-
buyout firms. Zahra and Fescina (1991), in an influential review of the past research, found 
more negative than positive effects of buyouts on R&D in most sample firms. Long and 
Ravenscraft’s (1993) reported a similar finding: buyouts cause R&D intensity to drop by 40 
percent.  
 Though many of those studies were conducted more than ten years ago, the debate 
regarding the relationship between privatization and innovation has not been solved to date. 
Recently, some researchers (Wright et al; 2000; Wright et al, 2001) have again raised the 
innovation issues in privatized firms. They proposed that the role of private ownership in 
innovation can be more than providing incentives. Private ownership can also lead to 
effective governance structures for innovation. According to Francis and Smith (1995), 
agency incentives and monitoring are not effective for innovation. Because innovation is 
characterized by its long-term nature, high-risk, and unpredictability, the contracting and 
monitoring costs associated with innovation would be especially high. In addition, 
contractual arrangements are likely to restrain experiments, so they may not encourage 
innovation efforts. Therefore, Wright et al (2000) reasoned that “independence might be an 
important antecedent for innovation”. They further argued that private ownership would 
“become an important way of encouraging and governing R&D activity”. In another study, 
6Wright and colleagues (2001) showed how privatized firms are committed to developing new 
products and technologies, obtaining patent rights, and engaging in R&D joint ventures.  
1.2 Research Question 
 The above review on the privatization of public firms indicates that the body of 
research work regarding the relationship between privatization and innovation, focused in the 
U.S., has produced conflicting arguments and empirical results (Zahra, 1995). On the one 
hand, private ownership is likely to motivate owner-managers to invest in long-term projects 
such as R&D; on the other, high levels of debt financing could damage firms’ financial 
flexibility due to debt payment, thus reducing firms’ capability for innovation investments. 
Earlier studies demonstrated a negative relationship between buyouts and R&D investments 
(Long & Ravenscraft, 1993), but recent research suggests buyouts may facilitate innovation 
(Wright et al, 2001). This study attempts to untangle some controversies about innovation in 
privatized firms by extending the work on privatization of public firms in the West to 
formerly state-owned enterprises (“SOEs” for short) in China. 
 Specifically, I examine how private ownership and firm debt may affect R&D 
investments in Chinese privatized SOEs. I focus on Chinese privatized firms converted from 
small- and medium-sized SOEs. This context permits an examination of the effect of private 
ownership and debt on managerial pursuit of R&D projects while minimizing the impact of 
other factors. First, Chinese privatized firms usually do not face pressure to seek immediate 
gains or even sell valuable assets to service the debt loads. Second, these privatized firms, 
controlled by the management, make their own decisions on R&D investments. Though 
differences exist between privatization of public firms in the Western context and 
privatization of SOEs in the Chinese context, the similarities in rationale for privatization, as 
7discussed in the following chapter, provide a basis on which the empirical results from the 
Chinese context could be compared to those of similar studies in the Western context. This 
comparison may shed light on some unsolved issues to date. 
 By addressing how private ownership and firm debt might influence R&D investments, 
this study would enrich our understanding of privatization. Private ownership and debt 
financing are two basic components of privatization. Existing studies have used incentive-
based models to explain the effect of private ownership (Fox & Marcus, 1992; Wright et al, 
2000; Zahra, 1995). However, incentives may also cause risk averse behavior (Beatty & 
Zajac, 1994; Sanders, 2001), thus discouraging R&D investments. Heavy debt has been 
argued to influence R&D investments negatively because of its constraining effect on both 
strategic and financial flexibilities due to debt payments (Rappaport, 1990; Seth & 
Easterwood, 1993). However, there is also evidence that leveraged buyout firms did not 
reduce their investment effort in unrelated businesses more than comparable public firms 
(Wiersema & Liebeskind, 1995). This evidence suggests that debt may restrict financial 
capabilities for R&D investments but may not restrict managerial behavior to engage in R&D 
activities. Therefore, the effect of privatization on R&D investments may be more complex 
than the traditional explanations. 
 Privatization has become a major vehicle to revitalize the national economy in the 
developing countries which formerly adopted centralized economic systems. One assumption 
behind the privatization initiatives is that private ownership is superior to state ownership 
(Arens & Brouthers, 2001; Ramamurti, 2000). In spite of the expectation, privatization may 
not always achieve success in the emerging economies (McDonald, 1993; Wright et al, 1998). 
Given the importance of innovative activities such as R&D investments in privatized firms 
8(Wright et al, 1998; Zahra, 1995), by investigating how private ownership and debt might 
affect managerial pursuit of R&D projects, this study sheds light on how we might better use 
privatization as a restructuring tool in decentralizing economies. 
1.3 Summary of the Dissertation 
1.3.1 Theoretical Framework 
 In addressing the effect of private ownership and firm debt on R&D investments, I 
integrate the traditional theories with a risk perception framework. Traditional theories have 
predicted direct effects of private ownership and firm debt on R&D investments. Private 
ownership may affect R&D investments positively because private ownership produces 
strong incentives and effective governance structures for R&D activities. Debt may influence 
R&D investments negatively because of reduced financial capability resulting from debt 
payments. In addition, debt may not contribute to R&D investments for two other reasons. 
First, the risky nature of R&D investments would make debt less likely become a financing 
tool for R&D projects; second, firms may prefer internal financing for R&D activities in 
order to reduce information disclosure.  
 Given the risky nature of investments in R&D projects, and the controversial evidence 
about the traditional explanations of the effect of private ownership and firm debt on R&D 
investments, this study also establishes a risk perception framework to explore the indirect 
relationship between private ownership/firm debt and R&D investments. This framework 
suggests that there might be a link between private ownership/firm debt and R&D 
investments. This link is managerial risk perception of R&D projects. Private ownership 
could decrease and also increase risk perception. Risk perception in turn would affect 
managerial behavior in R&D investments. Firm debt could restrict investment capability in 
9R&D projects, but it may also influence R&D through risk perception. This risk perception 
framework may explain some conflicting evidence regarding the relationship between private 
ownership/firm debt and R&D investments, thus complementing the traditional theories.  
1.3.2 Empirical Results 
 The integration of traditional theories with the risk perception framework leads to two 
sets of hypotheses: direct and indirect effects of private ownership and firm debt on R&D 
investments. The hypotheses were tested from the data collected in China. The data came 
from two groups of industries with low and high R&D intensity respectively. The empirical 
results provided strong support for the direct effect of firm debt on R&D investments. The 
relationship between private ownership and R&D investments was mixed.  
 In testing the indirect impact of private ownership and firm debt on R&D investments, 
risk perception was found to have strong negative effect on R&D investments. The 
relationship between debt and R&D investment was found to be partially mediated by risk 
perception. Though there was no evidence about a mediated relationship between private 
ownership and R&D investments, private ownership did have impact on risk perception.  
 After the sample was broken up into two groups consisting of low and high R&D 
industries, new evidence was found about the influence of private ownership and firm debt 
on R&D investments. The new evidence also suggests the importance of risk perception in 
managerial pursuit of R&D projects in privatized firms. 
1.3.3 Overview of Dissertation 
 This dissertation includes five additional chapters. Chapter 2 first reviews the 
privatization of SOEs in the emerging economies. The review shows similarities between the 
privatization of public firms and SOEs. Those similarities form a basis on which the results 
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from one type of privatization may be compared to those from the other. Next, I describe the 
privatization of SOEs in the Chinese context. This description sets a context for hypothesis 
development. 
 In Chapter 3, I first review theories about the relationship between private 
ownership/firm debt and R&D investments. Then, I discuss the risk perception framework 
and its application in a Chinese context. Finally, I develop specific hypotheses which are 
tested in Chapter 4.   
 Chapter 4 presents the research methodology employed in this dissertation, including 
the sample, data collection, and measures. Chapter 5 reports the results of the data analysis. 
Chapter 6 presents conclusions and implications of the research.  
 
CHAPTER 2 
PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is twofold. First, I review the literature on SOEs and the 
privatization of SOEs, largely in the context of emerging economies. Second, I discuss the 
privatization of SOEs in China, the world’s largest emerging economy. By describing the 
privatization of SOEs in the emerging economy of China, this Chapter sets up a context for 
the development of hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. 
2.1 State-Owned Enterprises and Privatization 
2.1.1 State-Owned Enterprises 
 SOEs rely on the state as owner, planner, and fund provider (Child, 1994). State 
governments plan key issues in SOEs, such as controlling production, determining careers, 
providing resources, and defining legitimacy (Arens & Brouthers, 2001). Because of the 
state-control, SOEs are “less sensitive to market incentives and influenced more by external 
political interests and public accountability”, and SOE managers have “less autonomy than 
managers of other ownership types due to external rules, such as civil service policies and 
rigid, hierarchical reporting requirements to government controllers” (Mascarenhas, 1989). 
The state protection of SOEs affords them preferential positions in markets, thus generating 
controversy about “unfair competition” (Walters & Monsen, 1979). As a result, SOEs have 
low motivation to conduct innovative activities (Nguyen et al, 2005), and are less adaptive 
and competitive in the market than their counterparts – privately-owned firms (Arens & 
12
Brouthers, 2001). SOE managers’ role is more administrative than market-oriented (Nguyen 
et al, 2005). Because SOEs do not take profit maximization as an important goal and often 
have diverse and intangible obligations such as preserving industries and employment, they 
usually evidence low efficiency (Mascarenhas, 1989). 
 SOEs are widespread in socialist systems, where they are the major organizational form. 
Under socialism, the philosophy of collective ownership is dominant (Kostera & Wicha, 
1996), and government agencies usually represent the “owners” to exercise supervising 
power over SOEs (Lin & Zhu, 2001). Though SOE properties are supposed to belong to 
society as a whole, they belong to no single actor or organization (Boycko et al, 1995). 
Poorly defined property rights (and responsibilities) put SOEs in a situation without 
principals (Aharoni, 1982). As a result, both governmental agencies and SOE managers lack 
incentives to maximize the performance of their enterprises (Ramamurti, 2000). 
 In the SOE setting, the society or collective citizens are owners and are responsible for 
monitoring management behavior. Because SOEs’ goals, such as maximizing public interests, 
are often vague, it is difficult for citizens as owners to monitor the agents’ or managers’ 
behavior and motivate them through incentive programs (Ramamurti, 2000). Though 
government agencies usually act on behalf of the society to play the supervising role, they do 
not need to take responsibilities for SOEs’ negative consequences, because poor performance 
can be aided by the state bailout money (Peng & Heath, 1996), which is often referred to as 
“soft budget constraint”, a common practice in SOE systems (Majumdar, 1998). As a result, 
SOEs have little motivation to improve financial performance, which leads to “inefficiency, 
waste of human and natural resources, slow technological progress and low labor morale” 
(Zhang, 2000).  
13
From the above analysis, we can see that under socialist systems, one major problem 
with SOEs is their unclear property rights. This problem leads to low managerial motivation. 
Another related problem is the agency problem caused by agency relationships between 
collective citizens and government agencies, and between government agencies and SOE 
managers.  
 Due to cumulative and widespread effects of low efficiency of SOEs, the privatization 
of SOEs has spread throughout the world. The past two decades have witnessed the mass 
privatization practice in the formerly socialist countries (Hoskisson et al, 2000). Through the 
transfer of state ownership, SOEs become private entities with clearer property rights and 
more direct control over management decisions and objectives (Ramamurti, 2000). 
 2.1.2 Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises 
 Privatization of SOEs is the transfer of firm ownership from the state to private 
investors. Starting from the United Kingdom in the early 1980s, and then progressing to other 
developed and emerging economies, this type of privatization has become a popular strategy 
for restructuring the national economies and promoting free market system. In the last decade 
of the twentieth century, more than $700 billion of state assets had been privatized 
throughout the world. Among them, 40 percent had occurred in the emerging economies 
(Ramamurti, 2000). The objectives of privatization may not be the same between developed 
and emerging economies. According to De Castro and Uhlenbruck (1997), privatization in 
the developed economies is more a philosophical issue, i.e., promoting free market systems, 
but in the emerging economies it is a development imperative. However, the privatization 
programs in both types of economies are usually guided by the same assumption: private 
ownership is superior to state ownership (Arens & Brouthers, 2001; Ramamurti, 2000). For 
14
the purpose of this study, this section focuses on the privatized firms converted from SOEs in 
the context of the emerging economies.  
 In the emerging economies, SOE managers, sometimes including employees, often 
become an important interested party in the privatization process, especially in small- or 
medium-sized SOEs, where they have more potential to purchase the SOEs (Ramamurti, 
2000). Managers and employees often can get preferential treatment in terms of discounted 
price and deferred payment, in part due to the lack of personal capital sources (Boycko et al, 
1996). In China, for example, a local governmental report about state ownership restructuring 
(Zhenjiang Government Report, 2003) describes a variety of measures the government has 
adopted to help the privatization of SOEs, including the use of net assets rather than total 
assets to price SOEs, the removal  of  bad assets, the deduction of losses and social burdens, 
etc. Due to these measures, buyers in emerging markets pay less in purchasing the SOEs.  
 After SOEs are privatized, the new form of organization possesses at least three 
advantages: first, property rights are clearly defined. Specific individuals – the owners – 
become responsible for monitoring firm performance (Ramamurti, 2000). Second, the 
management ownership stake in privatized firms overcomes agency problems resulting from 
agency relationships. The private owners have strong incentives to improve their firms’ 
performance in order to increase their wealth and avoid bankruptcy (Hanke, 1987). Third, the 
privatized firms operate on market rules instead of administrative orders: they employ 
capable managers and use incentive programs (Andrews & Dowling, 1998), they reduce 
redundant employees (Arens & Brouthers, 2001), they respond to customers on whom they 
rely for existence (Andrews & Dowling, 1998), etc. 
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Though private ownership can facilitate the improvement of firm performance through 
its motivational mechanisms, it may incur some disadvantages, compared with state 
ownership, in market competition. According to Mascarenhas (1989), SOEs enjoy 
government subsidies and bank loan guarantees. They also benefit from government 
assistance which forestalls competition, thus helping them build market share. Once 
privatized, however, SOEs would lose this government assistance. For example, bank loans 
can be more difficult to obtain.  In addition, the government support for remaining SOEs may 
create unfair market competition (Mascarenhas, 1989). 
 Because private ownership is believed to be superior to state ownership, the general 
hypotheses associated with SOE privatization are that privatized firms perform better than 
SOEs, and privatized firms improve their performance after privatization (Cuervo & 
Villalonga, 2000). Many empirical studies have supported these general hypotheses (e.g., 
Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; Frydman et al, 1997; Goic, 1999; Villalonga, 2000). However, 
controversial results are also reported concerning the success of privatization (Dharwadkar et 
al, 2000). For example, research conducted by McDonald (1993) and Wright and colleagues 
(1998) provides the evidence that many Polish and Russian firms did not accomplish 
efficiency after privatization.  
 Explanations for the failed success after privatization vary, but problems in political, 
environmental, and managerial aspects are often cited. For example, the under-developed 
legal systems and the inefficient input and output markets would make it difficult to take 
advantage of the benefits of privatization in the emerging economies (Cuervo & Villalonga, 
2000). The former SOE managers may not be able to adapt to the new competitive market 
conditions after they have become the owners of their enterprises (Barberis et al, 1996).  
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2.1.3 A Comparison between Privatization of SOEs and Public Firms 
 The analysis of privatization of SOEs in the emerging economies, compared with the 
privatization of public firms in the U.S. context discussed in the previous chapter, leads to the 
following conclusion: though public firms and SOEs are different organizations, they display 
similar features in privatization. As shown in Table 2.1, both public firms and SOEs are 
privatized for the purpose of performance improvement through reducing agency problems 
and increasing managerial motivation. The performance implications are also similar in the 
two types of firms: generally, privatization can improve organizational efficiency. These 
similarities form a basis for a comparison between the two types of firms in their 
privatization practice. 
 
Table 2.1 
A Comparison in Privatization of Public Firms and SOEs 
 
Privatization of Public Firms Privatization of SOEs 
Main Purpose  Improve performance  Improve performance 
Problems Solved 
 Agency problem minimized 
 Strong managerial motivation 
 Managerial discipline from 
debt  
 Clear property rights 
 Agency problem minimized 
 Strong managerial motivation 
New Problems 
 Limited financing capability 
 High debt burden 
 Limited financing capability 
 Application problems due to 
insufficient political, 
environmental, and 
managerial conditions 
Performance 
Implications 
 Increased short-term 
performance 
 Controversial long-term 
performance 
 Reported short-term 
performance improvement 
 Unclear long-term 
performance 
17
2.2 The Chinese Context 
2.2.1 Chinese State Sector and Reform 
 SOEs were once the dominant economic organizations in China. They played a key role 
in its economy, and also took most of social welfare responsibilities such as “housing, 
education, medical services, and retirement incomes” (Oswald et al, 2005). Though SOEs 
were organized based on collective ownership, government agencies usually represented the 
“owners” to exercise supervising power over SOEs. Government control was often 
substantial (Lin & Zhu, 2001). Due to operational inefficiency and low productivity (Zhang, 
2000), the state began the reform of its SOEs in 1979.  
 Unlike the former Soviet States and Eastern European countries which took the top-
down approach in their economic reform, China has adopted a bottom-up approach in 
reforming its SOEs. Experiments were conducted in some selected places and then spread 
across the country. Lin and Zhu (2001) reviewed the Chinese SOE reform history and 
divided it into three periods: pilot reform (1979-1983), increasing enterprise autonomy 
(1984-1992), and ownership restructuring (from 1993 on). The pilot reform began when 
China started its policy of “opening-up to the outside” and economic reform in 1978. In this 
first period, some SOEs were selected for experimentations; decision-making power moved 
to the enterprise level and rewards were tied to performance. Two measures were adopted for 
the purpose of increasing financial incentives and strengthening budget constraints: “tax for 
profit” and “loan for (fiscal) grant”, which means using tax to replace annual profit 
requirements, and turning grants into loans. 
 The second period of reform, characterized by further increase in the decision-making 
authority enjoyed by SOEs, began in 1984 with the introduction of the “SOE Management 
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Responsibility System”, which was gradually promoted in the entire state sector. This new 
measure created robust performance improvements in SOEs in the following years, which 
lasted till the end of 1980s. After that, the SOE performance began to decrease and the 
percentage of loss-making SOEs increased steadily despite their greater autonomy. The lack 
of incentives on the sides of both government agencies and SOEs was one major contributing 
factor in this decline. Government agencies, though they represented SOE “owners” to 
monitor SOE operations, had limited motivation because they lacked the legal rights to claim 
the residual income as the private owners did. For SOE managers, the link of rewards to 
enterprise performance was often weak because of the influence of “egalitarianism”, an 
ideology of equal distribution of incomes.  
 Two undesired outcomes accompanied the deteriorating performance. One was 
frequent intervention from government agencies. Though the decentralization of decision 
power to the enterprise level was obvious, interference from government officials seemed to 
increase (Zhang, 1999). The second was an increase in managerial corruption due to 
increased managerial autonomies. For example, managers and workers often made gains at 
the expense of the enterprise (Fong & Lam, 2004). These undesired phenomena, as well as 
the worsening performance, paved the way to the third period of reform: ownership 
restructuring or privatization of SOEs.  
 For political reasons, China never uses the term of privatization in reference to the 
ownership restructuring of SOEs (Wei et al, 2005). Instead, it uses the term of “shareholding 
system”. In order to be consistent with the privatization literature, I use the term of 
privatization to describe government sales or partial sales of state ownership to private 
investors in the Chinese context. 
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2.2.2 Privatization of SOEs 
 China began its massive privatization initiative in 1993 when the Company Law was 
introduced, with a basic framework partially modeled on Western corporate organizations. 
Privatization in China means transferring firms’ ownership status from state-owned to non-
state-owned. Three types of ownership transfer have occurred:  from SOEs to publicly-traded 
firms, to joint ventures owned by institutional investors, and to private firms owned by 
limited number of individuals (mostly managers). In each case, the government sometimes 
maintained a very limited share of ownership (Lin & Zhu, 2001). In this study, I focus on the 
third type of privatization, a form similar to management buyouts in the US context.  
 In China, the ownership restructuring occurred through arranged sales, auction, merger, 
bankruptcy, leasing and so on. There are four major actors in this process: the local 
government, SOE managers, SOE workers, and the banks (Garnaut et al, 2003). Local 
governments played a dominant role in the restructuring process because they legally 
controlled SOEs. SOE managers actively participated in this process because they often 
became the new owners in privatized firms. They often had significant bargaining power in 
negotiating terms with the local government. The SOE workers were primarily concerned 
with their job security. Banks were involved in the restructuring process because many SOEs 
owed debts to them. 
 Two factors became significant constraints in the privatization of SOEs: large number 
of surplus workers and heavy debt in SOEs. Surplus labor means that SOEs usually had far 
more employees than necessary. According to the citation by Hassard et al (2002) from South 
China Morning Post (May 7, 1997), the State Commission for Economic Restructuring 
predicted that 15-20 million surplus workers in the state sector would lose their jobs by 2000 
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and the estimated total number of surplus workers in SOEs were 54 million, close to half of 
the total workforce. Heavy debt burden is another constraining factor. Based on the Statistics 
on Industrial SOEs in Statistic Yearbook (China), the average debt-equity ratio in industrial 
SOEs from 1993 to 1999 is 1.89. That is to say, the debt level in SOEs was close to twice as 
much as equity.  
 In order to push forward the privatization process, the government provided some 
assistance in handling surplus workforce and heavy debt (Lin & Zhu, 2001). For example, 
the government sometimes helped placing the redundant work force. Financial liabilities 
sometimes were handled through debt-equity swaps, and some enterprises were granted 
preferential conditions or special treatments in debt payment based on different situations 
like management bargaining power. Despite the assistance from the government, the 
privatized firms often bear partial or full responsibilities to solve the problems of surplus 
workforce and heavy debt burden. 
 After privatization, four types of shareholders owned the former SOEs: the state (as a 
partial owner), institutions (mostly in the context of publicly-traded firms), management 
(often relatively or absolutely controlling the privatized firms), and employees. The corporate 
governance structures usually included shareholders and boards of directors.  
 The scope of privatization in China was substantial. According to Jesserson and Su 
(2006), the number of SOEs fell by nearly 50 percent in a five-year period from 1997 to 2001. 
More than 70 percent of small-sized SOEs have been privatized; the number of medium- and 
large-sized SOEs declined from 14,811 to 8675. Most of the remaining SOEs were waiting 
for privatization in the following years (Garnaut et al, 2003). By the time of 2003, the non-
state sector in China had contributed more than 60 percent of its industrial production and 
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employed over 90 percent of Chinese employees. In addition, the total taxes contributed by 
the non-state sector to the Chinese government accounted for more than 70 percent. 
Therefore, “China is indeed a market-oriented economy” (Fung, et al, 2006).  
2.3 Competitive Environment for Privatized Firms 
 After SOEs are privatized, they may not enjoy the protection and support from the 
government any more. They have to handle market competition effectively for survival and 
growth. The remaining SOEs become their competitors. Because of possible “unfair 
competition” with SOEs (Walters & Monsen, 1979), owner-managers in privatized firms 
may need to be more innovative than employee-managers in SOEs (Tan, 2001). 
 Another group of competitors is from foreign countries. Since China opened its door to 
the outside world in late 1970s, its huge market size has been attracting numerous foreign 
investors. It has been the second biggest host for foreign direct investment (FDI) since 1994, 
surpassed only by the United States (Deng, 2001). In 2002, China surpassed the United 
States to become the world’s largest FDI recipient (Ng & Tuan, 2004). This situation has put 
China’s markets at a high competitive level because the competition is global: American, 
Japanese, European and local firms compete (Stuttard, 2000).  
 This competitive environment is likely to encourage privatized firms to use innovation 
such as R&D investments to gain competitive advantages. In addition, the extensive local 
presence of western firms creates pressures on Chinese firms, which benchmark the “best 
practice” found in the Western firms, and as such, the privatized firms in China can be 
compared to their Western counterparts. 
2.4 Privatization Research in China 
22
Most studies on privatization in China have been in the field of economics (e.g., Fung 
et al, 2006; Jefferson & Su, 2006; Lin & Zhu, 2001), emphasizing the privatization of SOEs 
to publicly-traded firms or to firms owned by institutional investors. These studies have 
focused on the antecedents of privatization (Guo & Yao, 2005), the privatization process 
(e.g., Fung et al, 2006; Lin & Zhu, 2001), and economic performance (e.g., Wei et al, 2005; 
Sun et al, 2002).  
 There is one study that focuses on “insider privatization”, in which insider managers 
purchase the firm from the government (Li & Rozelle, 2004). This type of privatization is 
similar to management buyouts in the Western context. Li and Rozelle studied how buyout 
contracts affect the economic performance in these privatized firms. Insider privatization in 
China usually occurs in small or medium-sized firms because it is more likely for managers 
to purchase them. 
 There is very little research on how privatization might influence managerial behavior 
in R&D investments in China. This dissertation attempts to fill the research gap by focusing 
on the “inside privatization”, i.e., management buyouts and investigating the relationship 
between privatization and R&D investments. Next chapter addresses the theoretical issues 
and hypotheses regarding the effect of privatization on R&D investments. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This Chapter establishes the theoretical framework and develops the testable 
hypotheses. It includes three sections. The first section discusses R&D investments in 
privatized firms. This section focuses on the traditional theories and their problems in 
explaining the relationships between private ownership/firm debt and R&D investments. The 
traditional theories form a basis for the establishment of the direct impact of private 
ownership and firm debt on R&D investments. The second section presents a risk perception 
framework which would complement the traditional theories in addressing how private 
ownership and firm debt might affect R&D investments. The risk perception framework 
forms a basis for the establishment of the indirect impact of private ownership and firm debt 
on R&D investments. The last section develops specific hypotheses for testing. Figure 3.1 
presents the research model of this study. In this model, risk bearing is an inferred construct. 
3.1 R&D Investments in Privatized Firms 
3.1.1 R&D Investments 
 R&D investments have been treated as a critical innovation activity because of their 
importance to firm survival and growth. Research found that R&D investments have strong 
positive effect on firms’ growth opportunities (Ho et al, 2006). There is also evidence that 
R&D investments are critical to privatized firms (Wright et al, 1998). For example, buyout 
firms with high R&D intensity outperformed other buyout firms with no R&D expenditures 
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(Long & Ravenscraft, 1993). Despite their importance, R&D investments are risky and 
involve a great likelihood of failure (Baysinger et al, 1991; Graves & Langowitz, 1993).  
 
Figure 3.1 Research Model 
 
The riskiness of R&D investments results from the situation that the outcomes of R&D 
investments are neither immediate nor certain (Lee & O’Neill, 2003; Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). This intrinsic uncertainty in R&D investments leads to cost uncertainty of the 
project. During the stages of research and development, information is revealed to the 
innovators gradually, and investments can be sunk (Qian & Xu, 1998). Because of their risky 
nature, R&D projects may not produce any productive results (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). If a 
failure occurs, managers’ personal wealth and job security could be influenced. In addition, 
R&D investments influence firms’ short-term performance by decreasing net returns on the 
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current balance sheet (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989). Therefore, managers are often 
reluctant to invest in long-term R&D projects (Baysinger et al, 1991). 
 In addition to the risky nature, R&D investments are often firm specific because they 
generate knowledge-based assets within the firm (David & O’Brien, 2006). This firm specific 
feature of R&D investments creates causal ambiguity for outsiders (Dierickx &Coo, 1989). 
In addition, outsiders usually do not possess private information about R&D projects. 
Therefore, it would be difficult for outsiders to evaluate or monitor R&D activities (Chen & 
Huang, 2006; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). As a result, outsiders are often unwilling to finance 
R&D projects (Peyer and Shivdasani, 2001). 
3.1.2 Theories about Private Ownership and R&D Investments 
 It has been argued that private ownership contributes to managerial behavior in R&D 
investments (Francis & Smith, 1995; Wright et al, 2000). There are two basic explanations 
for this argument. One explanation is associated with “high-powered incentives” produced by 
private ownership (Wright et al, 2000). This explanation has its roots in agency theory and 
the theory of property rights, which are interrelated. Agency theory deals with the agency 
problem derived from the agency relationship between a principal and an agent (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). An agency problem arises when goal conflict exists between the principal 
and the agent, and it is difficult and expensive for the principal to monitor the agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Private ownership can be an effective way to solving the agency problem 
because of the owner-manager alignment. This alignment leads to strong incentives for 
managers to create more wealth for both the firm and themselves. For this reason, private 
ownership is expected to have positive impact on innovation projects such as R&D 
investments (Zahra, 1995). 
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Property rights theory argues that private ownership is more efficient than public 
ownership because the “concentration of benefits and costs [associated with business 
activities] on owners creates incentives to utilize resources more efficiently” (Demsetz, 1967). 
Under a public ownership system, an owner of a public property right does not need to bear 
the full costs of his activities. Others may not be willing to pay him appropriately for his 
activities. The owner cannot exclude others from enjoying the benefits of his efforts. Under 
this circumstance, the owner is unlikely to have the incentives to optimize the utilization of 
resources. R&D investments are often a long-term initiative and need sustained commitments 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989). The success of R&D projects could produce high returns. However, 
if others ignore the innovator’s efforts and can enjoy the benefits of R&D success, the 
innovator may not have incentives to conduct R&D activities. With a private ownership, the 
resource owner is motivated to maximize the value of output because others would not enjoy 
the benefits without appropriate contributions (Henry, 1999). Under this circumstance, R&D 
investments are more likely to occur. 
 The second explanation for the positive relationship between private ownership and 
R&D investments is associated with the governance of R&D activities. Holmstrom (1989) 
argued that contractual governance structures or diffuse ownership structures are not 
effective for R&D projects. Because of the risky and firm specific nature of R&D, 
contracting and monitoring costs would be “especially high”. Reliable performance measures 
are hard to design due to high costs of obtaining information. Through the alignment of 
ownership with control, contracting and monitoring costs can be minimized. Francis and 
Smith (1995) found that diffusely-held firms have fewer patent awards and are more 
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sensitive to the timing of R&D investments, so they concluded that diffusely-held firms are 
less innovative than closely-held firms. 
3.1.3 Theories about Debt and R&D Investments 
 Debt could be an important tool for financing investment projects. However, much 
research has shown that debt is negatively associated with R&D investments (Bhagat & 
Welch, 1995; Singh & Faircloth, 2005). One major explanation is the risky and firm-specific 
nature of R&D projects. On the firm’s side, revealing information about the projects is a 
necessary condition for obtaining outside financing. However, the cost of revealing R&D 
information could be significant. Competitors may imitate or copy innovation ideas, 
decreasing the value of R&D know-how. Therefore, firms are urged to finance R&D projects 
internally (Hall, 1992; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Bloch’s (2005) study found that internal 
funds are important in explaining R&D investments.  
 On the investor or lender’s side, it is important to evaluate R&D projects before 
selection and to monitor their ongoing development process effectively. However, the 
uncertainty of R&D investments makes them difficult to measure and assess, so outside 
investors are likely to face adverse selection problems (David & O’Brien, 2006). Monitoring 
R&D projects is difficult because of information asymmetry and causal ambiguity (David & 
O’Brien, 2006; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). For this reason, debt holders are inclined to adopt a 
policy in favor of cash flow generation in the short term rather than supporting uncertain 
R&D ventures (Peyer and Shivdasani, 2001). If outsider investors are willing to finance 
R&D projects, they may ask for a high return due to high risk. That is to say, firms would 
incur a high cost of external financing. Therefore, firms are likely to choose to maintain 
lower levels of leverage (Singh & Faircloth, 2005). 
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Evidence has shown that R&D projects are less likely to be financed by debt. When 
examining how investment projects are financed, Hall (1992) found that firms are more 
likely to use debt to finance physical investment but not R&D projects because of the risky 
nature of R&D. Chiao’s (2002) further study on the relationship between debt, R&D and 
physical investment had similar results. Chiao divided industries into nonscience-based and 
science-based and found that in nonscience-based industries, debt is a resource to finance 
both physical investment and R&D projects, but in science-based industries debt is only a 
resource to finance physical investment but not R&D. 
 Another explanation for the negative relationship between debt and R&D investments 
is the constraining effect of debt on investments due to debt payments (David &O’Brien, 
2006; Rappaport, 1990). Debt reduces financial slack by incurring interest costs, thus 
substantially influencing firms’ investment decisions (Devereux & Schiantarelli, 1990). The 
financial constraints resulting from high leverage would lead firms to invest in short-term 
cash flow projects (Whited, 1992). In order to “safeguard” financial strength, high R&D 
firms may opt to adopt lower leverage levels (Bhagat & Welch, 1995). Singh and Faircloth’s 
(2005) empirical study found that debt negatively influence R&D expenditures. 
3.1.4 Summary 
 The above literature review suggests a positive relationship between private ownership 
and R&D investments, and negative relationship between firm debt and R&D investments. 
Two factors contribute to the positive impact of private ownership on R&D investments: 
strong monetary incentives and better governance structures for R&D activities. Firm debt 
would influence R&D investments negatively because of the risky and firm-specific nature of 
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R&D investments, and the financial constraining effect of debt. From these theories, private 
ownership and firm debt would have direct impact on R&D investments. 
 However, there is also evidence that conflicts with these predicted relationships. For 
example, Beatty and Zajac’s (1994) empirical study suggests that the larger the equity stakes 
held by managers, the more risk averse they are. The main reason is that equity stakes tie 
managers’ wealth to firm performance, while firm performance is hard to predict. Therefore, 
managers are cautious about risky and uncertain projects. Sanders (2001) had similar 
findings that stock ownership makes managers less risk-taking. Because innovative activities 
such as R&D investments need risk-taking behavior (Jassawalla & Sashittal, 2002; Traynor 
& Traynor, 1997), ownership positions seem to have negative effect on R&D activities. Thus, 
private ownership does not necessarily lead to more innovative behavior, as predicted by the 
incentive-based models.  
 Wiersema and Liebeskind’s (1995) study found that leveraged buyouts did not reduce 
their investments in unrelated businesses, compared with similar public firms. That is to say, 
high levels of debt were not found to have negative impact on firms’ further investments. 
This finding suggests that the constraining effect of debt on investments may not always hold 
true. Debt may reduce firms’ financial capability to invest, but debt may not reduce 
managerial behavior to invest. From this perspective, the negative relationship between debt 
and R&D investments, as explained by current theories, needs to be reexamined.   
 The conflicting evidence with existing theories discussed above may require new 
theoretical explanations on how private ownership and firm debt might influence R&D 
investments. R&D investments are risky (Baysinger et al, 1991). Based on their risky nature, 
R&D investments may be associated with how managers deal with risk. From this point of 
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view, private ownership and firm debt may influence R&D investments through managerial 
risk behavior. The following section introduces a risk perception framework to describe the 
risk issue owner-managers face in their pursuit of R&D projects. I argue that managerial risk 
perception toward R&D projects could be a possible link between private ownership/firm 
debt and R&D investments, that is to say, private ownership and firm debt may influence 
R&D investments indirectly. This indirect relationship might be used to explain the 
conflicting evidence presented by Beatty and Zajac (1994), Sanders (2001) and Wiersema 
and Liebeskind (1995). 
3.2 A Risk-Perception Framework 
 The risk perception framework includes the following concepts: managerial 
perspectives of risk, risk perception of R&D projects, risk bearing, risk-taking behavior, and 
wealth motivation. Table 3.1 presents the definitions of these key terms in this study. In the 
following sub-sections, I explain these concepts in details and discuss how private ownership 
and firm debt might be linked to these concepts. These links form a basis for the hypotheses 
associated with the indirect impact of private ownership and firm debt on R&D investments. 
3.2.1 Managerial Perspectives of Risk 
 In decision-making theory, risk is usually defined as “variation in the distribution of 
outcomes, their likelihoods, and their subjective values” (March & Shapira, 1987). It is most 
frequently associated with “outcome uncertainty” (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992), often measured by 
the variance of the probability distribution of possible gains and losses related to a specific 
alternative (Pratt, 1964).   
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Table 3.1 
Definitions of Key Terms 
 
Terms Definitions 
Managerial 
perspectives of risk 
Managers treat risk as (1) uncertainty about negative outcomes; 
(2) magnitude of possible negative outcomes; (3) subjective risk 
Risk perception of 
R&D projects 
Perceived risk relative to R&D projects 
Risk bearing Perceived risk relative to managerial wealth 
Risk-taking behavior Decision-making behavior in risky contexts in which the 
expected outcomes of the decisions are uncertain 
Wealth motivation Managerial motivation to pursue wealth because of private 
ownership positions 
In the business context, however, risk is often not perceived in the calculative process 
defined in decision theory. According to March and Shapira (1987), three differences 
between the normative theory concerning risk and managerial responses to risk are obvious. 
First, for most managers, risk is treated as uncertainty about negative outcomes.  Uncertainty 
about positive outcomes is not looked upon as risk. Second, managers do not see risk as a 
probability concept. Instead, the magnitudes of possible outcomes would be more prominent 
to them. Third, managers do not objectively calculate risk.  They “feel” risk, or perceive risk 
subjectively.  
 Two empirical studies, one by MacCrimon and Wehrung (1986) which used 509 
Canadian and American executives as a sample, the other by Shapira (1986) which used 50 
American and Israeli executives as a sample, provided support for March and Shapira’s 
(1987) managerial perspectives on risk. This study investigates managerial behavior in R&D 
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investments in the business contexts, so March and Shapira’s managerial perspective on risk 
is appropriate.  
3.2.2 Private Ownership, Motivation, and Risk Perception of R&D Projects 
 Private ownership creates strong motivation for managers to maximize their own 
wealth (Fox & Marcus, 1992). The wealth motivation would lead to cognitive biases. 
According to Tiger (1979), strong motivation tends to produce optimistic bias, which can be 
defined as “an inflated tendency to expect things to turn out well” (Baron, 2004). The 
optimistic bias creates overconfidence, an unrealistic optimism about future and an illusion 
of control (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Simon et al, 1999). 
 Examples in the entrepreneurship literature demonstrate these cognitive biases. Cooper 
and colleagues’ (1988) research has shown that in pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities, 
entrepreneurs tend to be more optimistic than non-entrepreneurs in their assessments of 
business situations. Other studies (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Simon et al, 1999) have also 
provided evidence that entrepreneurs are subject to cognitive biases such as overconfidence 
and illusion of control.  
 Baron (1998) used an “affect infusion” model to explain why individuals’ emotions 
would influence their cognitive process. The theory suggests that current affective states 
derived from one experience can influence or “infuse” judgments about other events. This 
model can be exemplified by the following observations: if an individual is experiencing a 
good mood, he or she tends to evaluate things or people around favorably. On the contrary, if 
an individual is feeling irritable, he or she would perceive things or people around negatively.  
 Theoretically, affect infusion can be defined as a process through which “affectively 
loaded information exerts an influence on and becomes incorporated into the judgmental 
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process, entering into the judge’s deliberations and eventually coloring the judgmental 
outcome” (Forgtas, 1995). According to Forgtas, affect may influence people’s thinking and 
judgments in many ways, including its valence effect, arousal features, motivational impact, 
and cognitive appraisal patterns. 
 Baron (1998) noted that a large body of literature supports the impact of affect on 
judgmental outcomes. For example, when decision makers are eager to do something, they 
are likely to overestimate their abilities and may not recognize the possible uncertainties 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1997). Thus, I propose that managers’ strong wealth motivation 
triggered by private ownership would make them subject to cognitive biases such as 
overconfidence in their decision making. 
 When motivation for wealth causes cognitive biases, these cognitive biases in turn 
would influence individual risk perception of R&D projects. According to Kahneman and 
Lovallo (1993), cognitive biases like over-optimism could reduce individual perceived risk, 
and produce “bold forecasts” about the future. Some empirical studies offered support for 
this argument. For example, Keh et al (2002) used owners of small and medium-sized firms 
in Singapore as a sample and found that managers’ illusion of control reduces their perceived 
risk. Simon et al (1999) had similar findings based on students’ response to survey. Simon 
and Houghton’s study (2002) showed that cognitive bias would make managers 
underestimate the threat of competition.  
3.2.3 Risk Bearing and Risk Perception of R&D projects 
 According to agency theory, incentive programs should align the interests between 
stockholders and managers in public firms (Eisenhardt, 1989), so managers are supposed to 
act in stockholders’ interests and improve the firm value. Despite expectations, though, 
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incentive programs in public firms, including outcome-based rewards, stock options, and 
equity positions, do not always work as expected because they sometimes make managers 
risk averse, thus discouraging managers’ innovative behavior (Zahra, 1996).  
 When explaining why this would occur, Beatty and Zajac (1994) argued that 
organizational research has generally emphasized the positive side of incentives, but 
neglected one important negative outcome the incentive device would produce for managers: 
risk bearing, which is defined as perceived risk to one’s wealth. They used managerial 
compensation as an example: though pay-for-performance contracts provide strong 
incentives for managers to improve firm performance, these contracts also cause managers to 
bear risk due to firm performance uncertainty, or firm risk. The link of firm risk to 
managerial risk bearing is through the nature of the managers’ investment in their firms, 
which is “nondiversifiable and nontradable” human capital. With job loss, the manager loses 
the source of the capital. This potential loss is a risk bourn by the manager. 
 Because risk bearing is a kind of perceived risk, it is subject to change with situational 
factors. Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) proposed several factors may influence 
individual risk bearing: firm performance, stock options design, and the form of evaluation 
criteria. When the firm’s performance has been strong, executives, to the extent that their 
wealth is linked to firm performance, tend to perceive themselves as risk bearers. Because 
executives’ wealth is tied to firm performance, they face the possibility of losing more when 
they possess more. In contrast, bad conditions would make them bear low risk because they 
have little wealth to lose. While stock option programs can increase executives’ risk bearing, 
the design of the options may lessen the risk. If the down-side risk of stock options is set to 
zero, that is, “the stock option value is insulated from any adverse consequences of risk 
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taking”, the program may not create risk bearing for the executives. The use of behavioral 
criteria, as opposed to outcome-based criteria, can increase managerial risk bearing because 
managers feel uncertain about how performance will be evaluated.  
 With these examples, we can see that the level of risk bearing is associated with two 
factors; one is the amount of wealth which could be influenced, and the other is how 
uncertain individuals perceive in the future. These factors are consistent with managerial 
perspectives of risk (MacCrimon & Wehrung, 1986; Shapira, 1986): the magnitudes, instead 
of probability, of possible negative outcomes are more important, and executives “feel” 
rather than quantify uncertainty. 
 In privatized firms, the risk owner-managers bear can be greater than employee-
managers in public firms. Capital investments and their nondiversifiable nature make 
managers have more of their wealth attached to their firms. Future firm performance is hard 
to predict, so owner-managers would inevitably bear risk in the form of possible loss of their 
investments or wealth created by their investments. In addition, debt financing is often a 
condition for privatization. High levels of debt financing increase debt payments. This would 
have negative impact on short-term firm performance (Smart et al, 2004). Because 
managerial wealth is attached to firm performance, heavy debt loads would also make 
managers bear more risk. 
 Managers’ perceived risk to their wealth, i.e., risk bearing, is likely to contribute to 
their risk perception of R&D projects. According to affect infusion theory (Baron, 1998; 
Forgas, 1995), when managers feel that their wealth in the firm is being threatened, this 
affective state would influence their judgments about the R&D projects. They are likely to 
perceive more risk toward R&D investments because their wealth is perceived at risk. 
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In this study, risk bearing is used as an inferred construct which serves as a theoretical 
explanation on the relationships between the independent variables, i.e., private ownership 
and firm debt, and the moderator, i.e., risk perception of R&D projects. 
3.2.4 Risk Perception and Risk Behavior 
 Risk behavior can be defined as individuals’ decision-making behavior in risky 
contexts in which the expected outcomes of the decisions are uncertain, decision goals are 
difficult to achieve, or the potential outcomes include some unusual consequences (Sitkin & 
Pablo, 1992). Risk behavior can be risk-averse, risk-taking, or risk-neutral. According to 
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998), when people are risk averse, they prefer lower risk 
options at the expense of returns; if people are risk taking, they accept options where risk 
may not be fully compensated; and finally, when people display risk neutral behavior, they 
seek options where risk is compensated.  
 Much research has taken the assumption that risk perception affects risk behavior 
because decision makers are likely to perceive a risky situation first before making any 
decisions. Many studies have agreed that the relationship between risk perception and risk 
behavior is negative (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). According to Sitkin and Pablo, this negative 
relationship is consistent with the findings of prospect theory, though prospect theory does 
not take into account risk perception explicitly. People are more likely to be risk averse when 
they are experiencing possible loss of their assets, i.e., high risk perception, than they are 
when there is nothing to lose, i.e., low risk perception.  
 Empirical studies have supported this negative relationship between risk perception and 
risk-taking decisions. For example, Sitkin and Weingart (1995) used MBAs and 
undergraduates as two separate samples and found that in both samples, the more risk 
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individuals perceive, the less likely they make risky decisions. The entrepreneurship 
literature has also provided much evidence about the negative effect of risk perception on 
risk-taking behavior. Using a scenario approach to determine if entrepreneurs exhibit unique 
cognitive processes in dealing with risk-taking, Palich and Bagby (1995) found that 
entrepreneurs do not perceive themselves as being more predisposed to risk-taking than non-
entrepreneurs, but they perceive more strengths than weaknesses, more opportunities than 
threats, and more potential for performance improvement than deterioration. A study by 
Simon et al (1999) indicated that the risky new venture creation is associated with a lower 
level of risk perception. Cooper and his colleagues’ (1988) also found that 95% of 
entrepreneurs are confident in their ventures’ success, though statistics show that more than 
half of new ventures have failed.  
3.2.5 Summary 
 The above analysis leads to the following theoretical framework for privatization: 
private ownership may reduce risk perception of R&D projects because of wealth motivation. 
Wealth motivation could cause over-optimistic biases, which in turn would decrease 
perceived risk to R&D investments. Private ownership may also increase risk perception of 
R&D projects because of risk bearing. Firm debt could contribute to risk perception of R&D 
projects because debt payments may increase risk bearing. Risk perception of R&D projects 
would have direct impact on managerial risk behavior toward R&D. These theoretical 
arguments lead to specific hypotheses associated with indirect impact of private ownership 
and firm debt on R&D investments, which is presented in the following section.  
3.2.6 Theoretical Applications in China 
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This study adopts the incentive-based model which has been used to predict how 
privatization might influence R&D investments in the West. The incentive-based model 
should also apply in the Chinese context. SOEs were once a dominant economic organization 
in China. Because of unclear property rights, managerial motivation to improve firm 
performance was low. One major purpose of reforming SOEs was to increase managerial 
motivation. Linking managerial rewards to firm performance was an important incentive 
program. This link had produced significant performance improvement for some time (Lin & 
Zhu, 2001). Because of limitations of this non-ownership-based incentive, privatization was 
finally launched. Private ownership was expected to become a more powerful incentive 
device for managers to improve organizational effectiveness, and finally to improve the 
whole national economy. Therefore, incentives have also been recognized as critical in 
economic activities in the Chinese context. 
 The risk perception framework, which is developed to predict indirect effect of private 
ownership and firm debt on R&D investments, rests on the assumption of managerial 
perspectives of risk, i.e., subjective view of risk and magnitude rather than probability of 
negative outcomes being important. The managerial perspectives of risk should also apply to 
the Chinese context. A number of studies have been conducted about how Chinese people 
perceive risk and how their risk perception is influenced (e.g., Bontempo et al, 1997; Schmidt 
& Wei, 2006; Weber & Hsee, 1998). Among those influencing factors, cultural context is one 
of them.  
 According to McGrath and her colleagues (1992), uncertainty avoidance is a classic 
feature in Chinese culture. Change should not be forced by individuals because people 
assume “events have a natural course of action”. This culture has its origin in Confucianism, 
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with its emphasis on harmony and stable relationships (Ambler & Witzel, 2000). Hofstede 
(1980) and Trompenaars’ (1994) cultural studies have shown that China has strong tendency 
toward uncertainty avoidance.   
 Bontempo and colleagues (1997) proposed that cultural factors should affect 
individuals’ risk perception. In a culture characterized by high levels of risk avoidance, 
individuals’ perceived risk would be affected more by potential losses and less by potential 
gains. Their empirical study on cross-cultural differences in risk perception found that 
compared with those from Western countries, respondents with Chinese cultural roots are 
more sensitive to the magnitude of potential losses and less influenced by the probability of 
positive outcomes. This finding is consistent with the managerial perspectives of risk 
identified by Shapira (1986) and MacCrimon and Wehrung 1986) in the Western context.  
3.3 Hypotheses 
3.3.1 Direct Impact of Private Ownership and Firm Debt on R&D Investments 
a) Private Ownership and R&D Investments 
 Private ownership can produce strong incentives for owner-managers to pursue 
innovative projects such as R&D (Wright et al, 2000; Zahra, 1995) because R&D is likely to 
bring more value to the firm and the managers. In addition, private ownership would lead to 
more effective governance structures for R&D activities (Holmstrom, 1989; Francis & Smith, 
1995). Francis and Smith’s (1995) empirical study suggests that firms with diffuse ownership 
structures are less innovative than those with concentrated ownership structures. Therefore, 
owner-managers in privatized firms are likely to be more committed to R&D investments in 
order to create more wealth for themselves. The alignment of ownership with control would 
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minimize contracting and monitoring costs associated with R&D investments, thus making 
R&D activities more effective.  
 In the Chinese context, research on the relationship between ownership types and R&D 
investments is rare. One study by Zhang and colleagues (2003) examined how ownership 
might influence R&D efficiency. They used 8341 Chinese industrial firms as a sample and 
found that non-state firms have significantly higher R&D efficiency than state firms. They 
explained that high R&D efficiency may result from high R&D intensity. A possible reason 
is that R&D investments need a sustained commitment of energy and resources (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989). Because of low R&D efficiency in the state sector, Zhang et al (2003) suggested 
that state ownership in centralized economies would stifle firm innovative activities such as 
R&D.  
 Because of the importance of monetary incentives in Chinese economy, as evidenced 
by the reform of SOEs, and the risky nature of R&D investments, I extend theories 
developed in the Western context to the Chinese context. I predict that more private 
ownership would strengthen motivational effects and governance structures for R&D 
activities. Chinese privatized firms are usually dominated by the largest owner-managers. 
The larger the stake these managers hold in their firms, the greater the incentives they would 
have, and the more effective the governance structures for R&D could be. These arguments 
lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: All other things being equal, the size of largest owner-managers’ 
ownership is positively associated with R&D investments 
b) Firm Debt and R&D Investments 
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The literature has identified a negative relationship between firm debt and R&D 
investments (e.g., Bhagat & Welch, 1995; Whited, 1992). On the one hand, debt would limit 
firms’ financial capability to invest in R&D projects. On the other, debt is less likely to 
contribute R&D investments. Lenders may shy away from R&D projects because of their 
risky nature and information asymmetries; the innovator, in turn, would not be willing to use 
outside financing for fear of disclosing firm-specific R&D information.  
 In China, heavy debt burden in SOEs has become one major factor inhibiting 
privatization. It is not uncommon that the net value of many SOEs is negative. In this case, 
the government may have to compensate the new owners (Guo & Yao, 2005). The debt is 
largely the loan from the state banks. In order to obtain cooperation from the bank in 
privatization, many firms have to bear a significant level of debt (Guo & Yao, 2005; Lin & 
Zhu, 2001). Heavy debt would push managers to focus more on cash generation (Sing & 
Faircloth, 2005).  
 After privatization, the separation of the firm with the government is likely to put the 
firm in a difficult situation in obtaining bank loans, especially for the purpose of R&D 
investments. In market economies, lenders are often in favor of projects with strong cash 
generation prospects (Peyer and Shivdasani, 2001). As marketization progresses in China, the 
state bank is likely to become more market-oriented. It may also distance itself from the 
long-term uncertain projects such as R&D. Therefore, it would become hard for Chinese 
privatized firms to use debt to finance their R&D projects. That is to say, it is not very likely 
that a significant level of debt would contribute to R&D investments. 
 From the above arguments, the negative relationship between debt and R&D 
investments may still hold true in a Chinese context. Thus,  
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Hypothesis 2: All other things being equal, firm debt is negatively associated with R&D 
investments 
3.3.2 Indirect Impact of Private Ownership and Firm Debt on R&D Investments 
 Hypothesis 1 and 2 predict direct relationships between private ownership/firm debt 
and R&D investments. This prediction does not take into account the risky nature of R&D 
investments, which may need risk-taking behavior. However, people may not be risk-taking 
by nature (Eisendardt, 1989). If this is true, how would owner-managers launch risky R&D 
investments? This question leads to the arguments about indirect relationships between 
private ownership/firm debt and R&D investments.   
 a) Private Ownership and Risk perception of R&D Projects 
 Ownership positions represent the extent of interest owner-managers hold in their firms, 
and also represent the extent to which managers identify their interests with the interests of 
the firm. More ownership means more managerial interests in the firms, which in turn would 
trigger higher managerial motivation to create more firm interests. Strong motivation tends to 
bring about optimistic bias (Tiger, 1979). This optimistic bias could reduce individual risk 
perception (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). Therefore, managers with high personal stake in 
their firms are likely to perceive low risk related to R&D projects. 
 High ownership positions may also lead to high risk bearing because managers have 
tied much of their personal interests to the firm performance (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998). However, when high motivation occurs, managers are likely to ignore the possible 
uncertainties lying ahead of them (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). From this point of view, high 
motivation would soften risk bearing. In a Chinese context, most managers had been earning 
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limited salary in their previous SOEs. The economic transition provides them with attractive 
opportunities to earn more money (Hoskisson et al, 2000). This situation possibly strengthens 
owner-managers’ motivation to pursue personal interests which were hardly obtainable 
previously.  
 Though low ownership positions mean low risk bearing, managers’ motivation to create 
firm value could also be low because of limited personal stake in the firm. Chinese culture is 
characterized by uncertainty avoidance which would lead to risk averse behavior (Yates & 
Lee, 1996). Under this culture, managers may not change their risk attitude without 
influencing factors. For example, Tse and colleagues (1988) investigated whether managers’ 
home culture would influence their decision-making and found that executives in mainland 
China were more likely to decrease their exposure to failure than Hong Kong and Canadian 
executives. Though executives from Hong Kong may share traditional Chinese heritages, 
they were influenced by their exposure to Western business practices. As a result, they were 
more likely to adjust their risk behavior. Other studies have shown that hostile environments 
lead individuals to become more risk-taking in China (Tan, 1996; Tan, 2001). In this study, I 
argue that high personal stakes in the firm could also make Chinese people adjust their risk 
behavior because high stakes would create high motivation.  
 In China, the largest owner-managers usually hold dual positions: chairperson of the 
board of directors and general manager (equivalent of CEO). This “CEO duality” would 
provide the largest owner-manager with undivided formal authority, thus leading to non-
separation of decision management and decision control (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). That 
is to say, the largest owner-manager would have the dominant power to determine the firm’s 
strategic and operational issues. Therefore, it can be reasonably argued that the largest 
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owner-manager’s behavior would influence the firm behavior dominantly, and the largest 
owner-manager’s risk perception could represent the firm-level risk perception. These 
arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
H3: All other things being equal, the size of largest owner-managers’ share is 
negatively associated with risk perception of R&D projects 
b) Firm Debt and Risk Perception of R&D Projects 
 A high level of debt can reduce operating margin due to the payment of high loan 
interests (Smart et al, 2004), and damage operating effectiveness such as reducing flexibility 
to environmental change, and reducing ability to seize new opportunities (Seth & Easterwood, 
1993). Thus, heavy debt loads would influence firm performance negatively.   
 In Chinese privatized firms, managers may not bear much personal debt. Debt is often 
associated with the firm and inherited from previous SOEs. However, this firm debt could 
also impose significant impact on the owner-managers. After SOEs were privatized, the 
owner-managers would find it difficult to diversify their investment risk, as well as their 
employment risk. As the marketization process advances in China, the labor market is 
gradually becoming mature. If a manager cannot run his own business well, his or her 
reputation is likely to be influenced negatively. As a result, finding a good job in other places 
would become difficult. Therefore, it is likely that the Chinese owner-managers have 
attached their wealth and personal career tightly to their firms. If their firms fail, they would 
lose everything. Under this circumstance, the uncertainty about firm performance could 
increase managerial risk bearing significantly. Because a high level of debt would have 
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negative impact on firm performance, managers are likely to bear high risk associated with 
their wealth in their firms. 
 Because current emotional states could influence individuals’ judgments about other 
events (Baron, 1998; Forgtas, 1995), it is expected that when owner-managers have more 
perceived risk to their wealth due to increased debt level in their companies, this perceived 
risk would contribute to their risk perception towards the R&D projects. That is to say, debt 
may have positive impact on managerial risk perception. The above arguments lead to the 
following hypothesis:  
H4: All other things being equal, firm debt is positively associated with risk perception 
of R&D projects 
c) Risk Perception of R&D Projects and R&D Investments 
 Because of the risky nature of investments in R&D projects, a large body of research 
has proposed that innovative activities such as R&D need risk-taking behavior (e.g., 
Jassawalla & Sashittal, 2002; Traynor & Traynor, 1997). Because risk perception has been 
reported to have a negative relationship with risk-taking behavior (Palich & Bagby, 1995; 
Simon et al, 1999; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995), it seems that perceiving low risk would 
facilitate managerial pursuit of R&D.  
 Conventional wisdom suggests that risk and return are positively correlated (Brealey & 
Myers, 1981). If a negative relationship between risk perception and R&D pursuit exists, it 
appears that people prefer lower-return projects. However, the proposed negative relationship 
between risk perception and R&D investments may not conflict with individuals’ pursuit of 
high-return projects. This can be explained by the difference between subjective and 
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objective risk associated with a project. In the business field, managers take a risky action 
because they may not perceive the action’s riskiness (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; March & 
Shapira, 1987). That is to say, risk-taking behavior might not respond to the real risk 
messages (Brown, 2005). There is evidence that people even deliberately adjust their 
perception about risk to reduce anxiety related to risk taking (Liberman & Chaiken, 1992). 
Thus, perceiving low risk toward a project does not necessarily mean managers prefer low-
return.  
 Chinese culture is generally characterized by uncertainty avoidance (McGrath et al, 
1992). This type of culture even more likely pushes individuals to perceive low levels of risk 
before taking any risky actions. Thus, the following hypothesis is developed:  
H5: All other things being equal, risk perception of R&D projects is negatively 
associated with R&D investments 
d) Mediated Relationship between Private Ownership and R&D Investments 
 Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 propose that private ownership influences risk 
perception, and risk perception in turn influences R&D investments. These arguments 
suggest that risk perception of R&D projects might be a link between private ownership and 
R&D investments. In other words, risk perception of R&D projects may mediate the 
relationship between private ownership and R&D investments. Sitkin and Pablo (1992) have 
recognized the role of risk perception in mediating the relationship between situational 
factors and individual risk behaviors. When a situation increases one’s perceived risk, risk 
aversion often arises; if a situation reduces one’s risk perception, a risk taking behavior may 
be triggered, though the objective risk may still be unknown.  
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Mediation can be full or partial. A partial mediation means that an independent variable 
influences a dependent variable both directly and indirectly (Simon et al, 1999). This study 
explores the relationship between private ownership and managerial behavior in R&D 
investments through a risk perception lens, but it does not exclude the possibility that private 
ownership may influence R&D activities directly. Hypothesis 1 predicts the direct 
relationship between private ownership and R&D investments. Therefore, I develop the 
following hypothesis:  
H6: All other things being equal, the relationship between the largest owner-managers’ 
share and R&D investments is partially mediated by risk perception of R&D projects 
e) Mediated Relationship between Firm Debt and R&D Investments 
 Hypothesis 4 predicts that firm debt affects risk perception of R&D projects, and 
Hypothesis 5 proposes that risk perception of R&D projects affects R&D investments. 
Therefore, it could be that risk perception of R&D mediates the relationship between firm 
debt and R&D investments. Because firm debt might influence R&D investments directly, as 
predicted in Hypothesis 2, the mediated relationship between firm debt and R&D 
investments is likely to be partial. Therefore, I develop the following hypothesis: 
H7: All other things being equal, the relationship between firm debt and R&D 
investments is partially mediated by risk perception of R&D projects 
 In summary, I propose two sets of hypotheses: one set is associated with the direct 
effect of private ownership and firm debt on R&D investments, and the other set associated 
with the indirect effect of private ownership and firm debt on R&D investments. Table 3.2 
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summarizes the two sets of hypothesis and the underlying theories which support those 
hypotheses. In the next chapter, I discuss data sources, collection, and analysis to test all the 
hypotheses.
Table 3.2
Summary of Hypotheses and Underlying Theories
H IndependentVariables
Dependent
Variables Relationship Basic Ideas Authors
H1 Privateownership
R&D
investment Positive
Private ownership produces strong
incentives for R&D
Private ownership leads to effective
governance structures for R&D
Wright et al (2000)
Zahra (1995)
Holmstrom (1989)
Francis & Smith (1995)
Direct
Impact of
Private
Ownership
and Firm
Debt H2 Firm debt R&Dinvestment Negative
Debt reduces financial flexibility
R&D investments are less likely
financed by debt
Rappaport (1990)
Singh & Faircloth (2005)
Bloch (2005)
Peyer & Shivdasani (2001)
H3 Privateownership
Risk
perception Negative
Motivation causes cognitive biases,
reducing risk perception
Tiger (1979)
Baron (2004)
Kahneman & Lovallo (1993)
H4 Firm debt Riskperception Positive
Debt reduces operational
performance
Risk bearing leads to risk
perception due to affect infusion
Smart et al (2004)
Seth & Easterwood (1993)
Baron (1998)
Forgas (1995)
H5 Riskperception
R&D
investment Negative
Innovative activities such as R&D
needs risk-taking behavior
Negative relationship between risk
perception and risk-taking behavior
Managerial perspectives of risk
Jassawalla & Sashittal (2002)
Traynor & Traynor (1997)
Simon et al (1999)
Sitkin & Weingart (1995)
March & Shapira (1987)
H6 Privateownership
R&D
investment
Partially
mediated Integrating H1, H3, and H5
Indirect
Impact of
Private
Ownership
and Firm
Debt
H7 Firm debt R&Dinvestment
Partially
mediated Integrating H2, H4, and H5
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the research methods employed in this study. First, I discuss the 
sample appropriate for this study, and explain the data collection procedures. Second, I 
discuss the survey design and the pre-test to check the applicability of the survey in the 
Chinese context. Third, I describe the dependent, independent, moderator, and control 
variables included in this study and discuss how I measure them. 
4.1 Sample 
4.1.1 Data Collection and Survey Design 
 Data for testing the hypotheses came from China and were obtained by survey. The 
sample is composed of privatized companies who were formerly small to medium-sized 
SOEs. In order for all the sampled companies to be comparable, I only focused on those 
which are in the manufacturing field. In addition, the size of the sampled companies satisfies 
the following two conditions: the number of employees exceeds 100 and the value of total 
assets exceeding 8 million yuan (approximately $1 million).  For the purpose of this study, 
the sampled companies were privatized by means of management buyouts or “insider 
privatization” (Li & Rozelle, 2004). 
 The sample is focused on two types of industries with high and low R&D intensity 
respectively. R&D intensity is defined as the percentage of R&D expenditures to sales in an 
industry. R&D investments in privatized firms are likely to be affected by industries’ R&D 
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intensity (Fox & Marcus, 1992). Therefore, this design can compare two groups of industries, 
and the empirical results would provide implications on how industry characteristics might 
affect the relationship between private ownership/firm debt and R&D investments. The data 
for industry R&D intensity were obtained from China Statistical Yearbook on Science and 
Technology. Because of the unavailability of the data in the years of 2002, 2003, and 2005, I 
used a three-year average (2000, 2001, and 2004) to measure the industry R&D intensity. 
The group of high R&D industries is composed of four industries with an average of R&D 
intensity being 2.43; the group of low R&D industries also comprises four industries with an 
average R&D intensity being 0.50. The difference in R&D intensity between the two groups 
of industry is nearly five times. This difference ensures a comparison between the two groups 
of industry. Table 4.1 shows a description of the two groups of industry. 
Table 4.1 
High and low R&D industries 
 
High R&D Intensity Industries (%) 
2000 2001 2004 Average  Group Average 
Chemical Products 2.07 1.8 1.6 1.84 
Electronic & Telecom 2.98 2.8 1.8 2.60 
Electrical equipment 3.02 3.4 2.0 2.90 
Measuring Instruments 2.46 2.0 1.9 2.38 
2.43 
Low R&D Intensity Industries (%) 
2000 2001 2004 Average  Group Average 
Garment/Fiber products 0.53 0.50 0.40 0.48 
Miscellaneous 0.47 0.50 0.15 0.37 
Food Manufacturing 0.54 0.50 0.70 0.58 
Furniture Manufacturing 0.57 0.80 0.30 0.56 
0.50 
Note: Miscellaneous products include those products made from wood, bamboo, leather, fur, etc. 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology) 
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The background of this study is the controversy about the relationship between 
privatization and firm innovative activities such as R&D in the U.S. context. In order to for 
this study to shed light on this controversy, it is necessary to make the sampled firms more 
comparable to the buyout firms in the US context. Therefore, I chose two most developed 
provinces in terms of total number of private companies: Zhejiang and Jiangsu. Both 
provinces are on the top 5 list based on a five-year average (from 1997 to 2001, data source: 
China Statistical Yearbook). Besides, these two provinces are adjacent to each other with 
similar economic and cultural conditions. Table 4.2 describes Top 5 provinces in terms of the 
number of private enterprises.  
Table 4.2 
Number of Private Enterprises by Province (1,000) 
Provinces 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average Ranking 
Guangdong 120 141 161 184 211 163 1
Zhejiang 92 100 146 179 209 145 2
Jiangsu 70 108 136 174 225 143 3
Shanghai 69 95 110 138 176 118 4
Shandong 77 98 121 141 145 116 5
Because privatization and marketization are progressing hand in hand in China (Child 
& Tse, 2001), the regions with more private businesses can also be more developed in terms 
of market-oriented operation. In addition, marketization is often associated with the 
development of market-based institutions (Meyer, 2001), which ensure that private 
businesses can operate based more on market rules. These conditions would reduce the 
influence of non-market-related factors, especially political factors, on managers’ innovative 
behavior in their privatized firms.  
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The survey was originally developed in English and then translated into Chinese by a 
person who is bilingual. Then, the two versions of survey were cross-checked by two 
bilingual Ph.D. students in Kenan-Flagler business school. I finally sent the Chinese version 
of questionnaire to two business managers in China to make sure that no misunderstanding 
existed.  
 The survey subjects are the largest owner-managers in privatized firms, who are usually 
the chairperson and general manager. I entrusted the task of data collection to two persons in 
China: one was a bank employee in Zhejiang province, and the other was a government 
employee in Jiangsu province. In China, the bank and the government are two organizations 
which are able to get access to businesses widely and relatively easily. A two-step pretest 
was first conducted in Zhejiang province to check the applicability of the survey design and 
the reliability level of the risk perception measure developed by Simon and colleagues (1999). 
The bank employee first obtained the basic information about the privatized firms from his 
bank database. Then, he selected those companies which matched the requirements of my 
study. 
 The first pre-test was made in order to check the applicability of the survey. This pre-
test exposed the difficulty in data collection with the originally designed survey. Two 
problems existed. One was that many general managers refused to answer some “sensitive 
questions” like personal investments in their companies. The reason is that they did not really 
invest as much money as proportionate to their share percentages because they enjoyed some 
preferential treatments. The second problem with the original survey was gathering historical 
data in a five-year period. Many of owner-managers were unwilling to track the financial 
data more than three years ago. In a period of one and a half months, only six complete 
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responses were obtained. Based on this feedback, I modified the initial questionnaire, 
including removing the sensitive items and changing the historical period from five years to 
three years.  
 After the survey was modified, the second pre-test was started to check the reliability of 
the risk perception measure. This pretest was based on 41 completed questionnaires. The 
internal consistency was validated by high Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (U = 0.82). After the 
confirmation of the variable reliability, data collection in Zhejiang province continued and 
also started in Jiangsu province. The data collection process was different in these two 
provinces. In Zhejiang province, the bank employee used client visits to get the survey filled 
out. He sent the questionnaire to different offices across the province and asked his 
colleagues to bring the survey to the general managers of the privatized firms when they 
were paying customer visits.  
 Data collection in Jiangsu province was conducted through a mail survey. The 
government employee first obtained a list of privatized firms from the relevant governmental 
office. The office keeps a record of basic information about all the privatized firms, including 
company size and business scopes, so the government employee could select those 
companies which meet the requirements of the survey. Then, he randomly selected 100 
companies and mailed the questionnaire to the selected companies. In order to encourage the 
business owners to respond, he, as a government official, wrote a letter and attached the letter 
to the questionnaire, and he also made calls personally to some companies.  
 A total of 127 responses were finally obtained in the two provinces. Among them, 11 
responses were not complete, 16 did not meet the requirements of the study, and 7 were 
“outliers” because the R&D investments in these companies were ten times more than the 
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average of all other companies in each group of industry. Therefore, the usable size of the 
sample is 93. Table 4.3 describes the distribution of the sample. 
Table 4.3 
Sample Distribution (n = 93)   
Locations Industries 
Zhejiang 
Province 
Jiangsu 
Province 
High R&D 
Intensity 
Low R&D 
Intensity 
n = 54 n = 39 n = 51 n = 42 
4.1.2 Sample Size 
 According to Verma and Goodale (1995), sample size is a function of three factors: the 
significance level (U), statistical power, and effect size. Because Type I and Type II errors are 
dependent upon each other and reducing Type I  will increase Type II error, a high level of  U
leads to a low level of statistical power. In most of the social and behavioral sciences, U is 
taken to 0.05, and statistical power should be 0.80 to test the hypotheses (Cohen, 1992). 
Effect size is used to measure the strength of relationship between populations of interest. 
Because of the complexity of calculating effect size, Cohen (1988) suggested three levels of 
effect size – small, medium, and large effects – as rough guidelines in social and behavioral 
sciences. Dallal (1986) calculated the sample sizes associated with the three levels of effect 
size based on U equal to 0.05 and statistical power to 0.80 and concluded that the sample size 
should be 17 on a large effect, 44 on a medium effect, and 271 on a small effect. In this study, 
the sample is privatized firms converted from SOEs in the manufacturing field. The survey 
subjects are the largest owner-managers of the privatized firms and who were also the leaders 
of their previous SOEs. These common features in the sample can ensure a certain level of 
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similarity between the sample and the whole population. Therefore, a medium level of effect 
size should be sufficient. Because the minimum requirement of the sample size is 44, a 
sample size of 93 in the study meets this requirement. 
4.2 Measures 
a) Independent Variables 
 In this study, independent variables include the largest owner-manager’s share and firm 
debt level. I measured the Largest Owner-Manager’s Share as the relative share position the 
largest owner-managers hold in their privatized firms. Firm Debt was measured as the ratio 
of debt to assets and calculated as an average in a three-year period (2003-2005).  
b) Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable, R&D Investment, was measured as the percentage of R&D 
expenditures to sales based on a three-year average (2003-2005). 
c) Mediator 
 In this study, the mediator is risk perception of R&D projects. The largest owner-
manager’s risk perception was used to represent firm-level risk perception. This study 
adopted a measure developed by Simon et al (1999) which includes eight items. The scale 
had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85. For the purpose of this study, I adapted this scale by 
changing the term used to describe the new project (ODI’s contact lens) to R&D projects. 
The largest owner-managers were asked to describe their attitude toward R&D projects in the 
past three years (2003-2005). A seven-point scale was used (where 1 = strongly disagree and 
7 = strongly agree). The final score was based on the average of the eight items. Among eight 
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questions, two were reversely scored. The risk perception measure used in this study is as 
follows: 
I often thought that … 
1. The probability of R&D projects doing poorly would be low 
2. There was great uncertainty about how well R&D projects would do in the future 
3. The amount my company could lose by introducing R&D projects was substantial 
4. The overall riskiness of R&D projects was low 
5. The option of introducing R&D projects was something negative 
6. The introduction of R&D projects was a potential loss 
7. The introduction of R&D projects would have positive ramifications for my 
company’s future 
8. There would be a high probability of my company losing a great deal by  
introducing R&D projects 
d) Control Variables 
 SOE Tenure After Chinese SOEs were privatized, the former SOE leaders usually 
became the largest owners and also the general managers of the privatized firms. Research on 
Chinese SOE managers has shown that they tend to be conservative and avoid risky decisions 
(Adler et al, 1992; Nee, 1992; Tan, 2001). According to Abelson (1976), individuals’ past 
behavior would shape their cognitive structures which in turn influence their future behavior. 
Nguyen and colleagues’ (2005) empirical study on SOE reform in Vietnam supports 
Abelson’s proposal: SOE managers’ traditional ideology has imposed serious obstacles to 
their innovative behavior in the SOE reform processes. The formation of individuals’ 
cognitive structures is a gradual process. The more times individuals have experienced 
similar episodes in similar situations, the more stable the cognitive structures (Abelson, 
1976). Therefore, the largest owner-managers’ tenure at SOEs might influence their 
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innovation behavior in their privatized firms. This study controls for this possible effect, 
which is measured as the years when the largest owner-managers served as the leaders at 
SOEs.       
 Government ownership In the Chinese context, the government sometimes retains some 
shares (called state-share) in privatized firms. This state-share arrangement makes the 
government an interested party in these firms. Though the Chinese economy is transitioning 
from the centrally-planned to the more market-oriented one, the government still can impose 
significant influence on the private sector. For example, most privatized firms usually bear a 
significant level of debt which often takes the form of bank loans inherited from previous 
SOEs. After SOEs were privatized, the bargaining power of the bank would increase because 
the privatized SOEs have lost the government protection they enjoyed before. According to 
Smith and Warner (1979), this increased power on the side of debt providers will lead to 
managerial risk aversion behavior because the debt providers are usually hesitant to provide 
financial support for the risky projects. If the government is an interested party, it would 
likely offer assistance to the privatized firms such as helping firms ease immediate payback 
pressure by negotiating preferential loan terms for the firms. This support would decrease the 
degree of owner-managers’ risk aversion when they are facing increased bargaining power 
on the side of the bank. Therefore, the effect of the government should be controlled. One 
dummy variable is used, with government ownership coded 1 and non government 
ownership coded 0. 
 Industry This study uses data from two types of industry with low and high R&D 
intensity individually. It would be very likely that high R&D industries require more R&D 
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investments for firms to survive and grow. One dummy variable is used, with high R&D 
industries coded 1 and low R&D industries coded 0. 
 SOE performance The performance of privatized firms could be influenced by their 
previous SOEs’ performance. Good performance can increase firms’ financial capability 
which may facilitate R&D activities. Given the situation that the independent sources of SOE 
performance data are not available in China, I asked the general managers to assess their 
previous SOEs’ performance status based on a five-point scale (where 1 = very poor and 5 = 
very good). 
 Employee Redundancy Under the former centrally-planned economic system of China, 
most SOEs were over-staffed because recruitment was not based on business needs but on 
“plan” or “quotas” created by the government agencies. In the privatization process, the 
placement of “redundant employees” has become a serious problem (Gao & Yao, 2005; Lin 
& Zhu, 2001). In many situations, the privatized firms are required to “absorb” those 
redundant employees, which would decrease firms’ financial capability, and thus R&D 
investments. Employee redundancy is measured by the number of employees who were 
thought to be redundant and placed by the privatized firms, instead of by the government. 
 Firm Size The literature offers contradictory findings about the relationship between 
firm size and innovative behavior (Damanpour, 1992). Large firms may facilitate R&D 
activities due to rich resources, but they are also likely to obstruct R&D initiatives because of 
possible rigidity and bureaucracy. In this study, I expect that firm size would impose negative 
influence on firm R&D activities because inefficient large SOEs may not change their 
bureaucratic practices quickly after being privatized. Firm size is measured as the logarithm 
of firm assets. 
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Managerial Age In this study, I expect managerial age would negatively influence 
innovative behavior. The older a manager is, the longer he or she would have stayed in SOEs, 
and the more difficult the manager could adjust to the market-based practice. SOE managers 
have been found to be less innovative than entrepreneurs (Tan, 2001). A long time of 
exposure in SOEs would have negative impact on their innovative behavior. Managerial age 
is measured as the largest owner-managers’ age. 
e) Summary 
 The measurement of the independent and dependent variables and the moderator is 
summarized in Table 4.4.  
4.3 Data Analysis 
 SPSS 13.0 was applied to test all the hypotheses, including direct relationships and 
mediated relationships. I used three regression analyses to test the direct relationship 
proposed in Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The first model tested Hypotheses 1 and 2 by 
regressing R&D investments on private ownership and firm debt. The second model 
examined Hypothesis 3 and 4 by regressing risk perception on private ownership and firm 
debt. Model 3 investigated Hypothesis 5 by regressing R&D investments on risk perception.  
 To test the mediated relationship posited in Hypotheses 6 and 7, I used Baron and 
Kenney’s (1986) method that four conditions have to be met to establish a mediated 
relationship. The first condition is that the independent variables affect the mediator, which is 
the second regression model in this study. The second condition is the influence of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable. The first regression model examines if two 
independent variables, private ownership and firm debt, affected R&D investments directly. 
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Therefore, Model 1 tests the second condition. The third mediation condition is whether the 
mediator influences the dependent variable. In this study, the Model 3 describes this 
condition. Finally, the fourth condition is met if the effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable is less when the mediator exists than when the mediator does not exist. I 
used a fourth model by regressing R&D investments on private ownership, firm debt, and 
risk perception. If mediation exists, the effect of private ownership and firm debt on R&D 
investments should decrease when risk perception is included in the equation. A partial 
mediation means the effect of private ownership and firm debt on R&D investments is 
significant when the four conditions are met. 
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Table 4.4 
Variables and Their Measurement 
Variables Measurement 
R&D investments  Percentage of R&D expenditures to sales, based on a three-year average (2003-2005) 
Risk perception of 
R&D projects 
Largest owner-managers’ risk perception towards R&D projects in the 
past three years (2003-2005), using eight-item average based on 
seven-point scale 
Private ownership  Largest owner-manager’s relative ownership position 
Firm debt  Ratio of debt to asset, based on a three-year average (2003-2005) 
Industry  Dummy variable 
State ownership Dummy variable 
Firm size  Measured as assets (yuan) based on a three-year average (2003-2005) 
Employee 
redundancy Redundant employees placed by privatized firms 
SOE performance Largest owner-managers’ assessment of SOE performance based on five-point scale 
SOE tenure Years during which the largest owner-managers served as a leader in SOEs  
Managerial age Largest owner-manager’s age 
CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
This Chapter presents the empirical results in three sections. First, I describe descriptive 
statistics and bivariate correlations for key variables used in the study. Second, I present 
multivariate analyses based on pooled sample combining both low and high R&D industries. 
Finally, I conduct multivariate analyses based on separate samples, i.e., low and high R&D 
industries.   
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 First, the data were screened for potential problems such as violations of assumptions 
of normality. Skewness values range from -0.20 to 2.11, indicating normal distributions. 
Except for 7 outliers initially identified and removed from the final sample, no other outliers 
were detected. Table 5.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations.  
 As seen from Table 5.1, SOE Tenure and Managerial Age are highly correlated. Given 
that both variables are associated with the same person and measured with years, it is 
appropriate to remove one variable in order to avoid multi-collinearity. In this study, I keep 
the variable of SOE Tenure.  
 Table 5.2 and 5.3 summarize the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations 
associated with two separate groups of industry: low and high R&D industries. One 
difference between the separate samples and the pooled sample deserves attention: R&D 
investments and risk perception are not correlated in pooled sample, but correlated in both 
Table 5.1
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations (Pooled Sample)
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. R&D investments 1.89 1.24
2. Risk perception 2.91 0.94 -0.04
3. Private ownership 0.45 0.16 0.11 -0.29**
4. Firm debt 0.58 0.13 -0.46** 0.30** -0.18
5. Industry 0.55 0.50 0.77** 0.34** -0.08 -0.22*
6. State ownership 0.14 0.35 -0.03 0.17 -0.30** 0.17 0.12
7. Firm size 3.88 0.40 -0.10 0.14 -0.49** 0.22* 0.03 0.39**
8. Redundancy 66.89 113.63 -0.01 0.07 -0.27* 0.11 0.09 0.33** 0.47**
9. SOE performance 2.32 0.57 0.21* -0.29** 0.08 -0.16 0.06 0.10 0.00 -0.02
10. SOE tenure 7.05 2.34 -0.06 0.23* -0.12 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.06 -0.23*
11. Managerial age 48.74 4.57 -0.14 0.17 0.01 0.23* -0.12 0.07 0.19 0.16 -0.24* 0.58**
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Table 5.2
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations (Low R&D Industries)
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. R&D investments 0.84 0.40
2. Risk perception 2.56 0.65 -0.50**
3. Private ownership 0.47 0.15 0.47** -0.51**
4. Firm debt 0.61 0.09 -0.42** 0.40** -0.29
5. State ownership 0.10 0.30 -0.07 0.13 -0.19 0.25
6. Firm size 3.87 0.39 -0.33* 0.32* -0.47** 0.27 0.24
7. Redundancy 55.74 86.43 -0.22 0.14 -0.34* 0.19 0.17 0.48**
8. SOE performance 2.29 0.51 0.34* -0.35* 0.14 -0.05 0.14 -0.01 -0.22
9. SOE tenure 6.98 2.41 -0.23 0.28 -0.31* 0.07 0.07 0.23 0.18 -0.35*
10. Managerial age 49.36 4.42 -0.19 0.36* 0.15 0.19 0.12 0.33* 0.24 -0.36* 0.54**65 
Table 5.3
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations (High R&D Industries)
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. R&D investments 2.76 1.01
2. Risk perception 3.20 1.05 -0.52**
3. Private ownership 0.44 0.17 0.24 -0.18
4. Firm debt 0.55 0.15 -0.48** 0.40** -0.17
5. State ownership 0.18 0.39 -0.22 0.15 -0.35** 0.18
6. Firm size 3.88 0.38 -0.17 0.06 -0.51** 0.22 0.49**
7. Redundancy 75.24 132.13 -0.10 0.01 -0.23 0.12 0.39** 0.49**
8. SOE performance 2.35 0.63 0.26 -0.33* 0.05 -0.18 0.07 0.01 -0.06
9. SOE tenure 7.12 2.30 -0.12 0.23 -0.04 0.06 0.20 0.01 0.01 -0.15
10. Managerial age 48.24 4.68 -0.04 0.17 0.10 0.22 0.07 0.10 0.15 -0.15 0.64**
66 
67
separated samples. There are three differences between the two groups of industries. First, 
the mean of R&D investments in high R&D industries is more than 3 times as much as that 
in low R&D industries. Second, the mean of risk perception of R&D projects in high R&D 
industries is higher than in low R&D industries. Third, private ownership is correlated with 
R&D investments and risk perception in low R&D investments, but not in high R&D 
industries. In both groups of industry, SOE tenure and managerial age are highly correlated, 
so it is appropriate to remove one of them.  
5.2 Findings from Multivariate Analysis 
 Multivariate regression analyses were performed to test all seven hypotheses. The 
analyses were conducted in two steps. The first step was to test the hypotheses on the basis of 
a pooled sample combining both low and high R&D industries. The second step was to use 
low and high R&D industries separately. The purpose of the second step was to examine how 
private ownership and firm debt might influence R&D investments in different types of 
industry. Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 summarized the results of the two-step analyses.  
5.2.1 Findings from Pooled Sample 
(a) Direct Impact of private ownership and firm debt on R&D investments 
 Hypothesis 1 suggested a positive relationship between private ownership and R&D 
investments, and Hypothesis 2 proposed a negative relationship between firm debt and R&D 
investments. Model 1 presents the results for the two hypotheses, after controlling for 
industry, state ownership, firm size, employee redundancy, SOE performance, and SOE 
tenure. The relationship between private ownership and R&D investments is not significant. 
Table 5.4
Multivariate Regression Results (Pooled Sample)
Model 1
R&D
Model 2
Risk Perception
Model 3
R&D
Model 4
R&D
Risk perception -0.40*** -0.22**
Private ownership 0.10 -0.19 a 0.06
Firm debt -0.25*** 0.31** -0.19**
Industry 0.73*** 0.40*** 0.88*** 0.81***
State ownership -0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.04
Firm size 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.00
Redundancy 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01
SOE performance 0.12* -0.23* 0.08 0.07
SOE tenure -0.02 0.13 0.02 0.00
R2 0.72 0.38 0.72 0.75
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.32 0.70 0.72
F statistic 26.56*** 6.3*** 30.89*** 27.16***
a < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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Table 5.5
Multivariate Regression Results (Low and High R&D Industries)
Low R&D Industries High R&D Industries
Model 1
R&D
Investments
Model 2
Risk
Perception
Model 3
R&D
Investments
Model 4
R&D
Investments
Model 1
R&D
Investments
Model 2
Risk
Perception
Model 3
R&D
Investments
Model 4
R&D
Investments
Risk perception -0.35* -0.15 -0.47** -0.35*
Private ownership 0.32 a -0.37* 0.26 0.14 -0.16 0.09
Firm debt -0.31* 0.27 a -0.27 a -0.41** 0.33* -0.29*
Industry
State ownership 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.13 0.09 -0.13 -0.10
Firm size -0.14 0.14 -0.19 -0.12 0.05 -0.12 -0.08 0.01
Redundancy 0.07 -0.19 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01
SOE performance 0.30 a -0.32* 0.21 0.25 0.18 -0.24* 0.12 0.10
SOE tenure 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.16 0.04 0.01
R2 0.40 0.44 0.32 0.42 0.30 0.28 0.32 0.39
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.33 0.20 0.27 0.19 0.16 0.22 0.27
F statistic 3.29* 3.8** 2.73* 2.94* 2.64* 2.36* 3.38** 3.34**
a < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. There was a significant and negative relationship 
between firm debt and R&D investments (Y = -0.25, p < 0.001), thus providing strong 
support for Hypothesis 2. 
(b) Indirect Impact of private ownership and firm debt on R&D investments  
 Hypothesis 3 examined the relationship between private ownership and risk perception 
of R&D projects. As shown in Model 2, the coefficient of private ownership is not significant 
at the level of p < 0.05, but significant at the level of p < 0.1, after controlling for industry, 
state ownership, firm size, employee redundancy, SOE performance, and SOE tenure. Thus, 
private ownership had negative but weak effect on risk perception (Y = -0.19, p < 0.1), 
providing a weak support for Hypothesis 3. Model 2 also tested Hypothesis 4, which 
suggested that firm debt had positive impact on risk perception. The result provided strong 
support for the positive relationship between firm debt and risk perception (Y = 0.31, p <
0.01).  
 Hypothesis 5 proposed that risk perception affects R&D investments negatively. The 
results of Model 3 suggest that there is a strong negative relationship between risk perception 
and R&D investments (Y = -0.4, p < 0.001), after controlling for industry, state ownership, 
firm size, employee redundancy, SOE performance, and SOE tenure. Therefore, Hypothesis 
5 is supported.  
 Among control variables, the high R&D industries were found to have more R&D 
investments than low R&D industries. In Model 1, the relationship between SOE 
performance and R&D investments is significant and positive (Y = 0.12, p < 0.05). In Model 
2, SOE performance was found to have significant negative relationship with risk perception 
(Y = -0.23, p < 0.05). In addition, industry had strong impact on risk perception (Y = 0.40, p <
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0.001), that is, managers perceived more risk to R&D projects in high R&D industries than in 
low R&D industries. 
 Model 1, 2, 3 and 4 were used to test the mediated relationships between private 
ownership/firm debt and R&D investments. Hypothesis 6 predicted that risk perception 
partially mediates the relationship between private ownership and R&D investments. Four 
conditions should be met for the partial relationship to exist. The first condition is that private 
ownership should affect risk perception. The result from Model 2 indicates a weak 
relationship between private ownership and risk perception. Model 1 tested the second 
condition: private ownership has direct relationship with R&D investments. However, the 
coefficient of private ownership is not significant, after controlling for industry, state 
ownership, firm size, employee redundancy, SOE performance, and SOE tenure. Thus, the 
second condition is not satisfied. The third condition is the existence of relationship between 
risk perception and R&D investments, which was supported by Model 3. Model 4 explored 
the effect of risk perception on the relationship between private ownership and R&D 
investments. The result suggests that no effect exists. Therefore, there is no mediated 
relationship between private ownership and R&D investments, providing no support for 
Hypothesis 6. 
 Hypothesis 7 suggested risk perception partially mediates the relationship between firm 
debt and R&D investments. The results from Model 2 and 3 indicate that the first and third 
conditions are met, that is, firm debt has relationship with risk perception, and risk perception 
has relationship with R&D investments. The second condition is met from Model 1, which 
suggests that firm debt affects R&D investments significantly (Y = -0.25, p < 0.001). Model 1 
and 4 shows that the effect of debt on R&D investments is less when risk perception was 
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added in the equation (Y = -0.19, p < 0.01) than in the third equation when risk perception 
was excluded (Y = -0.25, p < 0.001). Thus, the fourth condition is also satisfied. Given that 
all the four conditions are met, Hypothesis 7 was supported. 
5.2.2 Findings from Low R&D Industries 
 As seen in Table 5.5, empirical results in low R&D industries show some differences 
from those in the pooled sample. The results of Model 1 propose that private ownership has 
positive but weak relationship with R&D investments (Y = 0.32, p < 0.1), providing weak 
support for Hypothesis 1. The relationship between debt and R&D investments is negative 
and significant (Y = -0.31, p < 0.05), so Hypothesis 2 was supported. Model 2, which tested 
Hypotheses 3 and 4, indicates that private ownership has a negative relationship with risk 
perception (Y = -0.37, p < 0.05). Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was supported. The effect of firm 
debt on risk perception is positive but weak (Y = 0.27, p < 0.1), providing a weak support for 
Hypothesis 4. Model 3 reports that risk perception affects R&D investments negatively (Y = -
0.35, p < 0.05), thus supporting Hypothesis 5. Among control variables, the relationship 
between SOE performance and risk perception is significant and negative (Y = -0.32, p < 
0.05). SOE performance also has a positive but weak relationship with R&D investments (Y
= 0.30, p < 0.1). 
 Model 4, together with Model 1, 2, and 3, tested the mediated relationship between 
private ownership/firm debt and R&D investments, i.e., Hypothesis 6 and 7. The four 
conditions, required for a mediated relationship, were not met for Hypothesis 6 and 7. 
Therefore, the mediated relationships between private ownership/firm debt and R&D 
investments do not exist in low R&D industries.  
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5.2.3 Findings from High R&D Industries 
 From Table 5.5, results from high R&D industries have shown a picture quite different 
from those in low R&D industries. Model 1 proposes no effect of private ownership on R&D 
investments, and significant effect of firm debt on R&D investments (Y = -0.41, p < 0.01). 
The results of Model 2 show no significant relationship between private ownership and risk 
perception, and significant positive relationship between firm debt and risk perception (Y =
0.33, p < 0.05). Model 3 suggests a strong negative relationship between risk perception and 
R&D investments (Y = -0.47, p < 0.01). Model 4, together with Model 1, 2, and 3, indicates 
that risk perception mediates the relationship between firm debt and R&D investments. There 
is no mediated relationship between private ownership and firm debt. SOE performance was 
found to have negative impact on Risk perception (Y = -0.24, p < 0.05). 
5.2.4 Summary of the Findings 
 The findings from both pooled and separate samples are summarized in Table 5.6. 
Discussion of these findings is presented in the next chapter. 
Table 5.6
Summary of Key Results
Proposed Relationship Pooled Sample Low R&D Industries High R&D Industries
H1: Positive relationship between private
ownership and R&D investments Not Supported
Supported weakly
(p < 0.1) Not supported
Hypothesis
Testing:
Direct impact of
private ownership
and firm debt
H2: Negative relationship between firm
debt and R&D investments Supported Supported Supported
H3: Negative relationship between
private ownership and risk perception
Supported weakly
(p < 0.1) Supported Not supported
H4: Positive relationship between firm
debt and risk perception Supported
Supported weakly
(p < 0.1) Supported
H5: Negative relationship between risk
perception and R&D investments Supported Supported Supported
H6: Risk perception partially mediates
the relationship between private
ownership and R&D investments
Not supported Not supported Not supported
Hypothesis
Testing:
Indirect Impact of
private ownership
and firm debt
H7: Risk perception partially mediates
the relationship between firm debt and
R&D investments
Supported Not supported Supported
Other Findings
Pooled Sample: (1) High R&D industries had more R&D investments than low R&D industries; (2) Managers had
higher risk perception in high R&D industries than in low R&D industries; (3) SOE performance had negative impact
on risk perception and positive impact on R&D investments
Low R&D industries: SOE performance had negative impact on risk perception and positive but weak impact on R&D
investments
High R&D industries: SOE performance had negative impact on risk perception
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
“Without innovation, (we are) waiting for death; with innovation, (we are) courting death” 
A note left on a returned questionnaire by a respondent (a Chairman and General Manager of a 
privatized firm located in Zhejiang province of China) 
 
This Chapter discusses the empirical results and presents implications from these 
results. First, I explain the major findings from this study. Second, I suggest implications for 
academics, practitioners, and policy makers. Finally, I discuss some major limitations of the 
study and present research directions in the future. 
6.1 Discussion 
6.1.1 Discussion of Findings 
(a) Direct impact of private ownership and firm debt on R&D investments 
 Privatization is often characterized by two components: private ownership and debt 
financing. This study starts with the controversial arguments about the relationship between 
privatization and innovative activities such as R&D in the Western context. Private 
ownership aligns interests between owner-managers and their firms, so it is expected to 
produce strong incentives for owner-managers to engage in innovative activities. Heavy debt 
financing would decrease firms’ financial flexibility due to debt payments. When a firm’s 
financial flexibility decreases, its capability for further investments would also decrease. 
Therefore, it has been argued that leveraged buyouts could “kill” innovation (Zahra & 
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Fescina, 1991). Rappaport (1990) even proposed that high leverage makes buyouts “worse 
than the disease”. These arguments suggest that private ownership increases R&D 
investments and debt decreases R&D investments. 
 I extended these arguments in the Western context to the Chinese context, and 
developed and tested hypotheses regarding the direct effect of private ownership and firm 
debt on R&D investments. The empirical results show a strong negative relationship between 
firm debt and R&D investments, thus supporting the argument about the negative impact of 
debt on R&D activities. This result suggests that existing theories regarding the relationship 
between debt and R&D investments also apply in the Chinese context. A high level of debt 
may reduce financial flexibility for R&D investments due to interest payments. In addition, 
the risky R&D projects may be less likely to be financed by debt. 
 The results for the relationship between private ownership and R&D investments are 
mixed. Private ownership was not found to increase R&D investments in the pooled sample 
and high R&D industries. However, in low R&D industries private ownership had positive 
but weak impact on R&D investments. These findings did not strongly support the incentive-
based models, and suggest that the motivational effect of private ownership may not apply in 
all situations. According to Beatty and Zajac (1994), ownership incentives would also 
produce a negative impact on innovation – risk averse behavior. This could be one reason 
why private ownership was not found to contribute to firm R&D investments to a significant 
level. 
(b) Indirect impact of private ownership and firm debt on R&D investments  
 Given the risky nature of R&D investments and controversial arguments and evidence 
regarding the relationship between private ownership/firm debt and R&D investments, I 
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argued that private ownership and firm debt might affect R&D investments indirectly, and 
their relationships could be mediated by risk perception of R&D projects. Therefore, I 
developed a risk perception framework to test the indirect relationships between private 
ownership/firm debt and R&D investments. Private ownership is likely to increase and also 
decrease R&D because it is likely to produce risk bearing, as well as motivational effects. 
Firm debt may not constrain owner-managers to conduct R&D activities if their risk 
perception is low.  
 The empirical results show that risk perception strongly reduces R&D investments, 
which suggests that risk perception might play an important role in managerial innovation 
behavior in Chinese privatized firms. Private ownership ties managerial wealth to firm 
performance. Though R&D investments could bring more value to the firm and the owner-
managers, R&D projects are very likely to fail (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) and may not result in 
any productive results because of their uncertain  nature (Lee & O’Neill, 2003). If R&D 
projects fail, it will impose negative impact on firm performance, thus managerial wealth. 
Therefore, owner-managers are likely to take great precaution toward these risky projects.  
 Though high risk is often presumably associated with high return (Brealey & Myers, 
1981), this study suggests that in Chinese privatized firms, owner-managers do not seem to 
deliberately pursue risky projects for possible high returns. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that owner-managers prefer low return projects in order to meet their risk 
averse preference. According to managerial perspectives of risk (March & Shapira, 1987), 
managers often perceive risk instead of calculating risk. It is possible that managers may 
perceive low levels of risk even though the inherent risk of a project is high. The disparity 
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between subjective and objective risk helps explain the risk-return dilemma faced by 
managers. 
 The strong negative relationship between risk perception and R&D investments can 
also be explained by risk bearing theory (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998). Owner-managers have a high stake in their firms, so they bear more risk than the 
employee-managers. Managers’ risk bearing increases as the uncertainty of firm performance 
increases. R&D investments, often long-term oriented, are likely to be made at the expense 
of short-term projects such as operational efficiency and market promotion, so R&D 
investments could have negative impact on short-term performance (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 
1989). If R&D projects are unsuccessful, they may also influence firms’ long-term 
performance negatively. R&D projects often consume a large amount of monetary resources. 
Any failure would render recouping these resources difficult or impossible. This outcome can 
influence firms’ long-term development. Therefore, R&D investments are likely to cause 
managerial risk bearing. Owner-managers may select those R&D projects with a low level of 
perceived risk in order to reduce their risk bearing. 
 As predicted, firm debt was found to increase risk perception strongly. Though debt is 
an important corporate financing tool, it appears that a high level of debt is not welcome in 
Chinese privatized firms. Debt may reduce operational margins due to interest payments. The 
reduced short-term performance would increase risk bearing. That is to say, owner-managers 
would perceive that their wealth is threatened as the debt level increases. When they do not 
feel safe with their wealth, they could treat the risky R&D projects negatively. This 
phenomenon can be explained by Baron’s (1998) “affect infusion” theory, that is, 
individuals’ judgments about one event are influenced by their experience with other events.   
79
Firm debt was also found to decrease R&D investments partially through risk 
perception. The partially mediated relationship between debt and R&D investments suggests 
that debt influences R&D investments indirectly, as well as directly. The indirect relationship 
between debt and R&D investments indicates that the effect of debt on R&D investments 
may go beyond the financial capability explanation. When managers’ risk perception is low 
toward R&D projects, high debt loads may not necessarily constrain their behavior in 
investments. This finding would challenge the agency-based argument that high leverage 
would discipline managerial behavior in investments (Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Wiersema and Liebeskind’s (1995) study on managerial behavior in LBO firms did 
not find support for one hypothesis predicted by a rational perspective: LBO firms will have 
a lower level of investments in unrelated businesses than comparable public firms. The 
mediation role of risk perception could provide an explanation to this result. Though 
managers in LBO firms may be constrained to make further investments due to high leverage, 
their wealth motivation could possibly reduce their risk perception. The reduced risk 
perception is likely to facilitate their investment initiatives.  
 This study only found weak impact of private ownership on risk perception. This may 
be explained by the tension between wealth motivation and risk bearing which are likely 
created simultaneously by private ownership. Wealth motivation may decrease managerial 
risk perception because of cognitive biases, but risk bearing could increase risk perception. 
This finding provides some support for Beatty and Zajac’s (1994) argument: incentive 
devices like equity position do not always have positive effect on managerial innovative 
behavior. They can increase managers’ risk bearing relative to their wealth. Risk bearing is 
likely to discourage innovative behavior.  
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In low R&D industries, private ownership was found to reduce risk perception 
significantly. This result suggests that the effect of wealth motivation could be stronger than 
that of risk bearing in low R&D industries. From pooled sample, it was found that managers 
perceive less risk in low R&D industries than in high R&D industries. When managers 
perceive low levels of risk, their wealth motivation could increase because they can be less 
concerned with the risk factors associated with new opportunities. 
 Among control variables, SOE performance was found to have a negative impact on 
risk perception and positive impact on R&D investments. Though SOE performance was a 
pre-privatization phenomenon, it can be reasonably assumed that SOE performance 
contributes to the performance in privatized firms, especially in the near term. Based on this 
assumption, it can be assumed that good performance in privatized firms could reduce 
managerial risk perception and increase R&D investments. The reason may be associated 
with R&D financing. Because R&D projects are less likely to be financed from outsider 
sources (Singh & Faircloth, 2005), good performance can provide more internal resources for 
managers to conduct R&D activities. 
 The negative relationship between firm performance and risk perception seems to be 
contradictory with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). According to prospect 
theory, individuals tend to be risk averse in a gain situation because they have something to 
lose, but risk-taking in a loss situation where they have nothing to lose. In Chinese privatized 
firms, good performance, which is linked to a gain situation, appears to decrease risk 
perception and increase risk-taking behavior. One explanation for this phenomenon could be 
that private ownership produces strong wealth motivation, and the execution of wealth 
motivation is more likely in a situation with good performance. After Chinese SOEs were 
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privatized, they lose assistance and support from the government. They may find it more 
difficult to get the financial support from the bank for their R&D projects. Under this 
circumstance, good performance can equip privatized firms with good conditions to pursue 
new opportunities through R&D initiatives.  
 State ownership was predicted to have significant influence on risk perception and 
R&D investments, but the result did not support this prediction. One reason could be the low 
levels of ownership position the government holds in the privatized firms. Though the 
influence of the government on the private sector will still be strong (Child & Tse, 2001), the 
forces of marketization and privatization are likely to reduce its influence. When private 
ownership dominates in a firm, the owner-managers would have to take responsibilities by 
their own. They may not rely much on the government for support, such as requiring 
protection or financial resources, as they did before.  
 This study obtained samples from two groups of industry with low and high R&D 
intensity respectively. The empirical results show both similarities and differences in these 
two groups of industry. Risk perception influences R&D investments negatively in both 
industries. This evidence confirms one major assumption of this study: risk perception might 
play an important role in managerial pursuit of risky projects in privatized firms. However, 
the results also show that the influence of risk perception on R&D investments is stronger in 
high R&D industries. A possible explanation is that managers perceive more risk to R&D 
projects in high R&D industries, an empirical result of this study. According to Chiao (2002), 
firms in science-based industries would face more persistent competition than in non-
science-based industries. Therefore, R&D investments in high R&D industries are likely to 
be more uncertain than in low R&D industries. 
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In low R&D industries, the influence of firm debt on risk perception and R&D 
investments was not as strong as in high R&D industries. This result suggests that financial 
capability may not be a strong effect on managerial pursuit of R&D in low R&D industries. 
Given the finding that private ownership has impact on both risk perception and R&D 
investments in low R&D industries, the motivational effect from private ownership could be 
greater than the constraining effect from debt. Because managers perceive relatively low 
levels of risk to R&D projects in low R&D industries, they are more likely to be motivated to 
create wealth through investing in these projects. 
6.1.2 Summary 
 The above discussion of the research findings leads to the following conclusions. First, 
private ownership was not found to have significant impact on R&D investments, but it still 
could influence R&D investments directly, depending on contextual situations. In low R&D 
industries where managers perceive relatively low risk to R&D projects, private ownership is 
likely to increase R&D investments. Though private ownership was not found to influence 
R&D investments indirectly, it could have impact on risk perception, depending on 
contextual situations. Risk perception in turn would affect R&D investments. 
 Second, firm debt may influence R&D investments directly. This direct effect is likely 
to result from two explanations: constrained financial capability due to debt payments and 
less likelihood of using debt to finance R&D projects. Debt could influence R&D 
investments indirectly, i.e., mediated by risk perception. This result suggests that debt may 
reduce firms’ financial capability to invest in R&D projects, but may not constrain 
managerial behavior in conducting R&D activities.  
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Third, risk perception may play an important role in managerial commitment to R&D 
projects in privatized firms. This result may have something to do with the fact that owner-
managers have tied their wealth and employment career to the firm performance. The 
concept of risk bearing, which is developed in the Western context, may also apply in the 
Chinese context. 
 Lastly, good financial conditions contribute to managerial pursuit of R&D in Chinese 
privatized firms. Low levels of risk perception could be important for starting risky R&D 
projects, but risky behavior may also need financial resources as support. Financial resources 
are also likely to strengthen motivational effect. 
6.2 Implications  
6.2.1 Theoretical Implications  
 A major theoretical implication emerging from the research findings is a call for new 
theoretical perspectives to investigate the impact of privatization on managerial innovative 
behavior in R&D. The two findings of this study, no strong effect of private ownership on 
R&D investments and strong effect of risk perception on R&D investments, suggest that the 
incentive-based models, derived from agency theory and property rights theory, may not be 
sufficient to explain the managerial innovative behavior in the Chinese context. The 
introduction of a risk perception perspective may be appropriate for three reasons. First, 
privatization ties owner-managers’ wealth to firm performance. Because firm performance is 
often uncertain, privatization puts owner-managers in a risky situation. Second, R&D 
investments are risky and require risk taking behavior. However, people are often assumed to 
be risk averse (Eisenhardt, 1989). That is to say, not all people are risk taking. Third, Chinese 
culture is characterized by uncertainty avoidance, which may reduce the role of incentives. 
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By integrating the risk perception concept into the traditional incentive-based models, this 
study takes a step toward understanding of the effect of privatization on managerial 
commitment to innovative activities such as R&D. 
 Though this implication is derived from the Chinese context, I argue that it could also 
be important in the Western context. For example, Beatty and Zajac (1994) questioned the 
exclusive emphasis on the positive side of incentive devices. Their study found that the 
magnitude of executives’ equity positions influences their willingness to take further risk. 
The larger the equity stakes they hold, the less likely they will use the risky compensation 
contracts such as stock options. Their finding suggests that the motivational effect of 
incentive devices can be diluted by their negative consequence of risk averse behavior. 
Sanders (2001) also had a similar finding: the downside risk of stock ownership is likely to 
make CEOs less willing to engage in risky strategies. From these studies conducted in the 
Western context, it can be argued that human risk behavior may go beyond the cultural 
effects.  
 This study suggests the importance of risk perception in managerial pursuit of 
innovative projects such as R&D. Risk perception is “an individual’s assessment of how 
risky a situation is” (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). This assessment is a cognitive process in 
which individuals collect and process information, and form perceptions (Scherer & Cho, 
2003). Based on the link between risk perception and cognition, it may be useful to extend 
the risk perception concept to a broad cognitive perspective, integrating a cognitive 
perspective with the traditional incentive-based models.  
 From a cognitive perspective, privatization may change managers’ cognitive structures 
after they become owner-managers. A cognitive structure is a “hypothetical link between 
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stimulus information and an ensuing judgment” (Bieri et al, 1966). This hypothetical link is 
associated with knowledge storage or structures. Privatization provides strong stimulus 
information. By studying the “hypothetical link” between privatization and owner-managers’ 
ensuing behavior, we may better understand how privatization might influence managerial 
behavior. This cognitive perspective is consistent with Walsh’s (1995) argument about the 
importance of managerial cognition in answering the “how” question. According to Walsh, 
agency theory views managers as source of variance in firm performance, but it cannot 
answer “how managers might increase or decrease firm value”. “Enter[ing] cognition” would 
answer the “how” question.  
 A cognitive perspective may also be used as a theoretical framework to explain other 
managerial behaviors, as well as innovation behavior, in privatized firms. For example, it is 
still unclear whether privatization contributes to managerial commitment to long-term 
performance. Given the uncertain nature of long-term performance, Wright and colleagues 
(2000) suggested that the explanation of strategic growth in privatized firms requires an 
understanding of entrepreneurial cognition, as well as managerial incentives. Monetary 
incentives would motivate managers to pursue firms’ long-term performance, but the role of 
these incentives is limited without entrepreneurial cognition. Wright and colleagues argued 
that without entrepreneurial cognition, owner-managers would be “frugal with R&D 
expenditure”. This behavior can be represented by the overall decline in R&D intensity in 
leveraged buyout firms (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993). 
 The findings of this study suggest the theoretical importance of a cognitive perspective 
in the field of privatization. In addition, this study also sheds light on theoretical issues in 
other fields. In the entrepreneurship literature, for example, it has long been debated whether 
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entrepreneurs are inherent risk-takers. Given the risky nature of entrepreneurship, it has been 
suggested that risk-taking propensity is one of the most distinctive features of entrepreneurial 
behavior, and it fundamentally distinguishes entrepreneurs from managers (e.g., Gasse, 1982; 
Leibenstein, 1968). Along with the argument that entrepreneurs are risk-takers, there are 
disagreements. McClelland (1961) proposed that entrepreneurs are pursuing tasks which are 
not like gambling in Las Vegas. Therefore, entrepreneurs tend to assess risks carefully before 
taking any risky actions. This study suggests that Chinese entrepreneurs may fall in the 
category of the latter argument: entrepreneurs might not take risk deliberately. After SOEs 
are privatized, the owner-managers become a kind of entrepreneurs. Because their risk 
perception influences their entrepreneurial behavior strongly, it seems that entrepreneurs may 
not necessarily possess some inborn traits such as risk-taking. 
 Finally, the findings of this study also contribute to the application of prospect theory in 
the Chinese context. SOE performance was found to influence risk perception negatively, 
and to encourage managerial behavior to invest in risky R&D projects. This result is not 
consistent with the prediction from prospect theory: gain situations would discourage risk 
taking behavior. Probably, the application of prospect theory is contextual. In China, 
privatization has provided managers with unprecedented opportunities to create wealth for 
themselves. When managers are motivated to pursue their goals, a gain situation could 
become good conditions for them to achieve those goals. Therefore, gain situations may 
facilitate innovative behavior. This implication may extend beyond the Chinese context. For 
example, Slattery and Ganster’s (2002) study in the US context found that in a dynamic 
uncertain environment, decision makers who have reached their goals set more risky goals in 
subsequent decisions, so they questioned the universal applicability of prospect theory. 
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6.2.2 Practical Implications  
 The research findings offer insights into how to make owner-managers more innovative 
so that they can pursue risky projects such as R&D in their privatized firms. Risk perception 
of R&D projects was found to strongly discourage owner-managers’ innovative behavior. It 
is necessary to manage their risk perception. Risk perception is a kind of cognitive state 
which is formed by individuals’ processing of information (Scherer & Cho, 2003). Therefore, 
it is possible to change one’s risk perception through manipulating information. Brown (2005) 
has mentioned that risk takers may minimize their risk perceptions by strategies such as 
further assessment of risk messages, avoidance of thinking about risk, de-emphasizing the 
importance of outcomes, and so on. When owner-managers are conducting innovative 
activities such as R&D, they are likely to reduce their risk perception through a range of 
strategies, including negative problem framing, emphasis on process controls (Sitkin & Pablo, 
1992), learning while innovating (Van de ven & Polley, 1992), etc.  
 Private ownership was not found to have strong effect on R&D investments. This result 
suggests that incentives from private ownership did not play a significant role in the sampled 
companies. It is suspected that managerial risk perception could be high. This risk perception 
may have neutralized the motivational effect. At the beginning of this Chapter, I displayed 
the note left by a survey respondent. This respondent treated innovation, referring to R&D 
projects, as critical to the firm survival. However, he also looked upon innovation as so 
dangerous that it would cause the firm failure. This dilemma implies that risk perception may 
have become a serious problem for Chinese owner-managers because their wealth is tied to 
firm performance. Innovation is important, but managers are never sure whether innovation 
can lead to success. The failure of innovation is likely to pose serious negative influence on 
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firm performance, thus managers’ wealth. As a result, owner-managers could become 
extremely conservative toward the innovation projects. 
 How to resolve this dilemma? Risk perception management, as described above, could 
be one approach. Because of the link between risk perception and cognition, it may also be 
important to change owner-managers’ mindset. Wright et al (2001) have recognized the 
importance of appropriate managerial mindsets in privatized firms. They suggested that 
managers in buyout firms should treat privatization as an entrepreneurial opportunity through 
which they can take advantage of both high-powered incentives and discretions. R&D 
projects are risky, but concerns about these risky projects “tend to be overruled” by the 
opportunity managers recognized (Wright et al, 2000). Through a change of mindset, 
managers could be both innovative and not afraid of being innovative, thus avoiding the 
dilemma faced by the survey respondent.  
 The last practical implication is associated with debt. Debt financing is often a 
necessary condition for privatization. This study found debt influences R&D investments 
both directly and indirectly. Because of the direct influence of debt on R&D investments, the 
level of debt financing should not reach a point where managers are forced to focus on short-
term gains. Debt would also influence R&D investments through risk perception. When debt 
levels are high, it is necessary to manage risk perception in order to keep the firm innovative. 
6.2.3 Implications for Policy Makers  
 In emerging economies, the privatization of SOEs has become a critical tool to improve 
the national economy. If the policy makers want to sustain the benefits derived from 
privatization, it is necessary for privatized firms to keep innovating. Firm innovation through 
R&D has been found important in privatized firms (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993; Wright et al, 
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1998). However, ownership transfer alone may not be sufficient to ensure innovative 
behavior. This study did not find a positive relationship between private ownership and R&D 
investments. A possible reason could be related to owner-managers’ strong risk perception of 
R&D projects. 
 Though policy makers may not be able to reduce owner-managers’ risk perception of 
R&D directly, they could help reduce risk perception through creating a safe environment. 
This study uses a concept of risk bearing, i.e., risk perception of wealth. Though this study 
did not test the effect of risk bearing, I would argue that risk bearing may exist in privatized 
firms. Owner-managers tie their wealth to the firm performance, while firm performance is 
often uncertain. Therefore, owner-managers are likely to feel uncertain about their wealth. 
Based on affect infusion theory, this risk perception of wealth may influence risk perception 
of R&D projects. From this point of view, it could be possible to reduce risk perception of 
R&D through reducing risk perception of wealth.  
 Risk perception is formed through information processing. Social contexts are an 
important source for information and can shape individuals’ attitude and behavior (Salancik 
& Pfeffer, 1978). In emerging economies, governments are adopting market-based policies to 
decentralize their national economy. However, the development of market-based institutions 
such as legal systems and capital markets has been slow and difficult (EBRD, 1998). There 
also exist economic and political instabilities (Hoskisson et al, 2000), which would greatly 
increase uncertainty for privatized firms. Under these circumstances, owner-managers may 
not feel safe with their private assets. That is to say, they could perceive non-trivial risk to 
their wealth. If policy makers can speed up the construction of market-based institutional 
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infrastructures, owner-managers’ perceived risk to their wealth is likely to be reduced. This 
reduced risk perception of wealth could be helpful for their innovative behavior. 
 In emerging economies, SOEs are often characterized by organizational inefficiency. In 
the Chinese case, heavy debt burden and a large number of surplus employees are a common 
phenomenon (Lin & Zhu, 2001). This study found that the performance of former SOEs 
could influence managers’ innovative behavior after SOEs were privatized. This finding 
indicates that the financially over-burdened SOEs might require some “unloading” before 
they are converted into privatized firms. Privatization is one of the most important tools to 
improve the national economy in developing countries. Policy makers should not transfer too 
much historical burden with SOEs to the privatized firms. If they are doing so, they may rid 
themselves of the inefficient public sector in the short term. In the long run, however, the 
over-burdened privatized firms may not do any good for the whole economy. 
6.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
6.3.1 Limitations  
 This study has several limitations. First, the largest owner-manager’s risk perception of 
R&D projects might not exactly represent the firm-level risk perception. In privatized firms, 
there is usually more than one shareholder. Corporate governance takes the form of the board 
of directors. Though the dual position of the largest owner-manager – chairperson and 
general manager – would make him or her dominate the board and the managerial team, 
other shareholders may also have voices in decision making.  
 Second, the retrospective approach to measuring risk perception may not be accurate. 
In order to ensure that the respondents answer the survey questions responsibly, I asked 
people from two influential organizations, the government and the bank, for help. They 
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interviewed the respondents in person or contacted them by phone and letters. These 
measures would minimize the errors from irresponsible responses, but may not remove the 
errors from other factors.   
 Third, data for testing hypotheses came from two groups of industry: high and low 
R&D industries. The classification of industry was based on the data from China Statistic 
Yearbook on Science and Technology in which industry is classified broadly. A broadly 
defined industry can include a number of sub-fields. Different sub-fields may require 
different levels of R&D investments. This study could not identify how sub-fields within a 
broad industry are linked to R&D investments.   
 Finally, the study did not control for risk propensity, which might influence managerial 
risk perception (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Individuals may have different risk preferences: risk 
taking or risk averse. Traditionally, individual risk propensity is conceptualized as a stable 
dispositional attribute (Rowe, 1977). However, Stikin and Weingart (1995) define risk 
propensity as “an individual’s current tendency to take or avoid risks”. This definition 
indicates that individual risk propensity may change over time. Because of the complexity of 
risk propensity, this study did not include it as a control variable. 
6.3.2 Future Research Directions 
 Opportunities for future research are ample and may come from two streams. One 
stream of future research is associated with the limitations of this study. First, the largest 
owner-managers’ risk perception may not represent the firm level risk perception because 
other managers may also pose their influence. It can be meaningful to research how the 
dominant managers’ behavior is influenced by other less important stakeholders. In emerging 
economies such as China, the privatized firms are often dominated by a single manager. This 
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domination would help establish clear lines of authority and responsibility, and facilitate 
decision-making (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). However, this single-person domination 
may lead to opportunistic behavior which damages other stakeholders’ interests (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and compromise effective decision-making (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). 
By researching how the largest owner-managers’ behavior is affected, we would provide 
implications on addressing both advantages and disadvantages of privatized firms dominated 
by single managers. 
 Given the difficulty of measuring an individual’s past cognitive state, this study 
assumed that managerial risk perception is relatively stable in a certain period of time. Future 
research may address whether risk perception is a relatively stable attribute and how risk 
perception might change over time. This study also assumed that risk perception is 
influenced by outside factors such as private ownership and firm debt. It may be interesting 
to research whether individual characteristics are likely to affect risk perception. 
 The specific features of an industry can influence innovation behavior of the firms 
within it. This study only broadly classified industries into two groups with low and high 
R&D intensity. It merits further investigation on how industry characteristics and dynamics 
might affect owner-managers’ pursuit of R&D projects. It can be interesting to study how 
industry players at different points of the industry value chain are influencing each other in 
their R&D activities.  
 The other stream of future research comes from some theoretical issues in the study of 
the research questions. At least three issues deserve research attention. First, wealth 
motivation and risk bearing from privatization are one major theoretical argument in this 
study. However, the relative strength between wealth motivation and risk bearing is unknown. 
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Given the importance of wealth motivation in privatization and the negative effect of risk 
bearing, it could be meaningful to investigate their relative strength and how it varies with 
situational factors. The different empirical results from two groups of industry, i.e., low and 
high R&D industries, have provided some insights into this question. It seems that wealth 
motivation is more likely to play a role in environments with low perceived risk. That is also 
to say, when risk bearing is low, wealth motivation could be high. 
 The second research issue is associated with debt. Debt seems to be a two-edged sword. 
On the one hand, it can be an important financing tool; on the other, it would reduce firms’ 
financial flexibility in investments. An interesting question is: what might be an ideal level of 
debt financing in privatization? The mediation role of risk perception between debt and R&D 
investments opens opportunities for researching how to take advantage of debt as a financing 
tool and at the same time minimize the constraining effect of debt on innovation investments. 
For example, when debt levels are high, is it possible to reduce the negative impact of debt 
through manipulating managerial risk perception? 
 Finally, this study extended the research on privatization in the U.S. context to the 
formerly state-owned enterprises in China. It is unclear from this study how different the two 
groups of privatized firms, those converted from public firms and those transformed from 
SOEs, are in their pursuit of R&D projects. Though the fundamental reasons for privatization 
of public firms and SOEs in the two contexts are similar, the innovation behavior of 
privatized firms in the two contexts may be different. A comparison of privatized firms 
between the two contexts would help us better understand privatization, which is an 
important corporate restructuring tool and has been used widely by both developed and 
developing economies. 
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